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Mapping the Power Struggles of the National
Green Tribunal of India: The Rise and Fall?
Gitanjali Nain GILL*
Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne
Abstract
This article documents the life-cycle of the National Green Tribunal of India (NGT). The NGT is
ofﬁcially described as a “specialised body equipped with necessary expertise to handle environ-
mental disputes involving multi-disciplinary issues”—a forum offering greater plurality for envir-
onmental justice. Its international and national recognition promotes it as an exemplar for
developing nations. The change management theory underpinning the paper is drawn from the
work of Kurt Lewin and Edgar Schein, thereby allowing the analysis of competing internal and
external forces affecting the NGT. There is a transmigration of theory and its application from one
discipline to another social science: business psychology and management to law. The article
identiﬁes and addresses the crisis, and analyses the reasons and actions of the principal actors or
forces interested in supporting the NGT and, on the other hand, those who are concerned, chal-
lenged, and affected by its growth, activities, and popularity.
Keywords: National Green Tribunal of India, environmental justice, change management
theory, specialized environmental judiciary, India
1. INTRODUCTION
What Though the Field Be Lost? All is not Lost.1
International declarations and institutions call for judicial specialization, envisaging expert
courts and judges and lawyers trained in environmental matters to advance the environmental
rule of law and promote sustainable development.2 Specialist environment courts and tri-
bunals are better positioned than general courts to develop innovative remedies and holistic
solutions to environmental problems by embracing a ﬂexible mechanism for dispute
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1. Milton (1667), L. 105.
2. Johannesburg Principles (2002); London Bridge Statement (2002); Rome Symposium (2003); Bhurban
Declaration (2012); Asian Development Bank (2012); Asian Development Bank (2015); United Nations Environment
Programme (2005); United Nations Environment Programme (2015).
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resolution.3 In this context, India’s commitment to a “green court” assumes signiﬁcant
practical importance. The National Green Tribunal of India (NGT) was established by statute
in 2010.4 Subsequently, the NGT acquired a national and international reputation based upon
its progressive, innovative environmental decisions that reach far beyond the courtroom
door. The judicial membership of the NGT comprises legal and scientiﬁc experts—a com-
position unique within India. It has resulted in a symbiotic, dynamic community of decision-
makers employing a vigorous, ﬂexible court process that offers swift, affordable, and open
public access through the widest possible interpretation of who is an aggrieved party.
The widespread recognition of this bold, innovative tribunal is fulsome and positive.
It stands as an exemplar for developing nations. Pring and Pring describe the NGT in their
path-breaking publication on courts and environmental tribunals as “incorporating a number
of best practices … and has become a major arbiter of some of the most pivotal environ-
mental battles in India.”5 They subsequently stated “the NGT has successfully expanded its
openness, procedural ﬂexibility, transparency and progressive judgments.”6 Lord Carnwath
of Notting Hill, Judge of the Supreme Court UK, observed the tribunal as “raising awareness
and a sense of environmental responsibility in the government, local and national, and the
public.”7 Chief Justice Brian Preston, Land and Environment Court of NSWAustralia, wrote
“the NGT is an example of a specialized court to better achieve the goals of ensuring access
to justice, upholding the rule of law and promoting good governance.”8 Judge Michael
Hantke Domas, Chief Justice of the Third Environmental Court Chile, focused on the novelty
and boldness of the NGT. According to Domas J., “as a new player in the Indian judicial
panorama, the NGT was strongly led by knowledgeable and valorous judges, who were ﬁt to
answer justice demands of the people represented by equally qualiﬁed and tenacious
lawyers.”9 Judge Michael Rackemann of the Queensland Planning and Environmental Court
considered “the NGT adopts a robust and expansionist approach to the interpretation of its
jurisdiction and powers.”10 Academic experts including Warnock described the NGT as
follows: “the NGT is one of the world’s most progressive Tribunals … the procedures
adopted, powers assumed, and remedies employed by the NGT are notable.”11 Ryall stated:
the emergence of the NGT, its contemporary jurisprudence and impact on Indian society provide
important insights for anyone interested in environmental governance and regulation … the
NGT is held in high esteem and enjoys a strong degree of public conﬁdence.12
Similar views have been expressed in India. The Vice President of India, M. Venkaiah
Naidu, applauded the tribunal by stating “the efforts and involvement of the NGT in
dispensation of environmental justice, evolving environmental jurisprudence, promoting
discourse and spreading awareness are commendable … all stakeholders stand united and
3. Preston (2012), p. 398.
4. The NGT Act 2010.
5. Pring & Pring (2016), pp. 34–5.
6. Ibid.
7. Carnwath (2017).
8. Correspondence with the author dated 29 May 2018.
9. Domas (2017), p. 560.
10. Rackemann (2017), p. 473.
11. Warnock (2017), p. 210.
12. Ryall (2017), p. 3.
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miss no opportunity to join hands for the same.”13 Prakash Javadekar, Minister for Human
Resource Development, in a similar vein stated “the NGT has been responsible for expedi-
tious dispensation of environmental justice in our country, thus, satisfying legislative intent
behind its enactment.”14 Judge Rajan Gogoi of the Supreme Court of India observed “Its
[NGT] advent marks another rendition of India’s green revolution … with the passage of
time the NGT has become one of the foremost environmental courts globally with a wide and
comprehensive jurisdiction.”15 Ritwick Dutta, a leading environmental barrister, stated “the
Green Tribunal is now the epicentre of the environmental movement in India …. It has
become the ﬁrst and last recourse for people.”16 Fieldwork undertaken at the NGT involving
interviews with lawyers and litigants appearing before the tribunal reinforce the professional
and public assessment of the value and appreciation of the strength of the NGT.17 A young
lawyer who appears before the NGT described it: “a bench of this kind with an expert
member is creating new environmental jurisprudence. The expert members help young
lawyers understand environmental issues.”18 Three litigants summarized their experiences
before the NGT as “our experience has been tremendous in the NGT benches. We are
attending the case in person and have been here three to ﬁve times. The NGT is a life saver.
The NGT has given us justice.”19
Nevertheless, these national and international commendations of the NGT tell but
part of the story of the tribunal. The tribunal has been subject to criticism at the national
level from key affected parties. For instance, “ofﬁcials speak about the Tribunal’s clamour
to get more powers and perks. They call it a ‘power-hungry institution’ that has failed
the purpose for which it was created.”20 The NGT has been accused of overstepping
its jurisdiction by not following the provisions of the NGT Act 2010, resulting in embar-
rassment to the government before Parliament.21 Again, the NGT’s orders have been
considered as a case of judicial overreach, as they disturb the balance of power between
the judiciary and the executive as envisaged in the Indian constitutional structure.
For example, the NGT’s general order banning mining of sand without a requisite environ-
mental clearance from the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority was considered
as a case of judicial overreach by Manohar Parrikar, the Goa Chief Minister. According to
Parrikar:
the order is a case of (judicial) overreach. Everyone knows the order is not implemented. It (the
order) has resulted in rise of prices and black marketing of sand …. If you stop economic
activity, we (Governments) will not have money to pay. We might also have to take a cut (from
the illegal sand mining operation)…. Irrational and sudden bans order going across board should
not be issued without hearing the State.22
13. Naidu (2017).
14. Javadekar (2017).
15. Gogoi (2017).
16. Dutta (2015).
17. Gill (2017).
18. Ibid., p. 155.
19. Ibid., p. 156.
20. Chowdhary (2014).
21. Anand (2013).
22. Mayabushan (2013).
MAPP ING THE POWER STRUGGLES OF THE NAT IONAL GREEN TR IBUNAL OF IND IA 3
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/als.2018.28
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 90.194.200.21, on 28 Aug 2018 at 16:18:02, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Similarly, the ministers and ofﬁcials from the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and
Manipur were of the view that sand-mining orders without prior clearance from the envir-
onment ministry across India was a case of not studying the situation in the north-eastern
states.23
There have emerged negative forces within India determined to contain or possibly close
the tribunal. This is an account of two campaigns—one seeking to promote the NGT, the
other constituting a restraining force. This article comprises four sections. It opened with a
brief account of the current standing of the NGT in judicial and academic international and
national communities. The second section presents the paper’s theoretical underpinning
derived from social psychology and organizational management scholarship. It offers
a practice-based, theoretical framework applicable to the NGT. The article employs a
transmigration of theory and its application from one discipline to another social science:
business psychology and management to law. In the third section, the history of the NGT is
unpacked by identifying the principal actors or forces, both positive and negative, involved
in the establishment, exercise, and review of the tribunal. Today, the NGT faces major
challenges regarding its future survival because of external “restraining forces” seeking to
downgrade its status and functionality. This section addresses this crisis, identiﬁes and
analyses the reasons and actions of those interested in supporting the NGT and, on the other
hand, those who are concerned and challenged by its growth, activities, and popularity.
This growing lobby constitutes a negative force seeking to restraint and even possibly close
the NGT. This oppositional struggle process commenced in 2011 and continues to date.
The conclusion reviews the relationship between theory and practice as played out in the life
history of the NGT.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THREE-STEP CHANGE MODEL
AND FORCE-FIELD THEORY
Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) is considered an inﬂuential physicist and psychologist and, for the
purposes of this paper, the founding father of change management theory.24 Lewin’s work on
planned change25 provides an elaborate and robust approach to understanding and resolving
social conﬂict, whether in an organization or wider society. As Edgar Schein commented:
The intellectual father of planned change is Kurt Lewin. His seminal work on leadership style
and the experiments on planned change that sought to understand and change consumer beha-
viour launched a generation of research in group dynamics and the implementation of change
programmes.26
The relevance of Lewin’s work to fast-changing modern organizations continues to this day.
Change management is deﬁned as “the process of continually renewing an organization’s
direction, structure, and capabilities to serve the ever-changing needs of external and internal
23. Shrivastava & Shrivastava (2015), p. 173.
24. Burnes & Cooke (2013), p. 408; Cummings et al. (2016), p. 34.
25. The planned change approach encompasses separate themes of work: ﬁeld-force theory, group dynamics, action
research, and a three-step model of change. These were considered by Lewin and coalesced into four mutually rein-
forcing themes to analyze and bring effective change.
26. Schein (1988), p. 239.
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customers.”27 The academic literature on organizational change reﬂects consensus on two
important matters. First, the pace of change is faster in the present economic and globalized
environment.28 Second, internal and external factors precipitate change and
affect organizations.29 Thus, change is “both pervasive and persistent and normality”30 but
simultaneously “reactive, discontinuous, ad hoc and often triggered by a situation of
organisational crisis.”31
Understanding organizational change requires an analysis of the “ﬁeld as a whole,”32 as it
helps to analyze scientiﬁcally the pattern of forces operating in the group. “The process is but
the epiphenomenon, the real object of the study is the constellation of forces.”33 In this
context, Lewin’s “three-step change model” and “ﬁeld-force theory” are of foundational
importance. There exists a body of lively, disparate opinion and literature about Lewin’s
diluted and overly simplistic theories that are beyond the scope of this article.34 For instance,
Kanter claims that “Lewin’s… quaintly linear and static conception—the organisation as an
ice cube—is so wildly inappropriate that it is difﬁcult to see why it has not only survived but
prospered.”35 Nevertheless, Lewin’s contribution remains the quintessence of organizational
change. It explores, assesses, and creates organizational realities to address and answer issues
about resistance, barriers, and failure to change initiatives.36
2.1 The Three-Step Change Model
Lewin’s “three-step change model” is considered as the bedrock of organizational change.
Successful change according to Lewin includes three aspects: “unfreezing the present
level … moving to the new level … and freezing group life on the new level.”37
Lewin also suggested that change at any level is determined by a force ﬁeld thereby
facilitating the movement of the organization to a new level of equilibrium.
UNFREEZE CHANGE REFREEZE
Figure 1. Kurt Lewin change model. Source: Lewin (1947); Schein (2010)
27. Moran & Brightman (2001), p. 111.
28. Balogun &Hailey (2004), p. 3; Graetz (2000), p. 550; Burnes (2009), p. 1; Kotter (2007), p. 2; Carnall (2003), p. 3;
Hussain et al. (2017), p. 2.
29. Kotter, supra note 28, pp. 5–6; Luecke (2003), pp. 3–5; Pierce et al. (2002), p. 628.
30. Hammer & Champy (1993), p. 23.
31. By (2005), p. 370.
32. Lewin (1997), p. 291.
33. Ibid.
34. Cummings et al., supra note 24; Clegg et al. (2005), p. 376; Child (2005), p. 293; Rummel (1975), p. 41; Hustedde
& Score (1995), p. 3; Burnes & Cooke, supra note 24, p. 421; Gulati (2007), p. 775; Tsoukas & Chia (2002), p. 570;
Marshak & Heracleous (2004), p. 1051.
35. Kanter et al. (1992), p. 10.
36. Burnes & Cooke, supra note 24.
37. Lewin, supra note 32, p. 330.
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Lewin’s basic paradigm (unfreeze–change–freeze) was elaborated and reﬁned
by Schein for a better understanding of the psychosocial dynamics of transformative orga-
nizational change.38 In his 2010 work, Schein observed that the process of change entails
creating the perception that the change is needed, then moving towards learning new
concepts, and ﬁnally institutionalizing new concepts as a norm.39
Accordingly, the ﬁrst step is “unfreezing or creating a motivation to change. This requires
the ‘group’ that is the target of change must unlearn something.”40 Unfreezing involves three
processes to develop motivation to change: (1) disconﬁrming data creating disequilibrium
due to the organization’s inability to achieve its goals or its processes, thereby pointing out
that “something is wrong somewhere”41; (2) making the members of organization uncom-
fortable and anxious, implying “unless we change, something bad will happen to the
individual, the group, and/or the organization”42; and (3) psychological safety, in the sense of
being able to see “the problem and learning something new”43 by adopting a positive vision,
team effort, and constructive support.
The second step is “cognitive redeﬁnition” that lays the groundwork for making the
change. Learning new concepts, expanding concepts with broader meaning and new stan-
dards of evaluation either through “imitating a role model … or scan our own environment
and develop our own solutions,”44 thereby moving to a new changed state. The mechanism
works best when there is clarity about the goals to achieve and the new way of working.
The ﬁnal step is “refreezing” wherein the new learning is reinforced and institutionalized
for producing better conﬁrmed actual results to ﬁx the problems that launched the change
programme.45 The change has been made and the emphasis is on structures and procedures
that help to maintain the changed behaviour in the system. Thus, to maintain the new change
as permanent, institutional policies and procedures should encourage and reinforce the new
behaviour until it becomes a habit.
The “three-step change model” (classic model) has become “far more fundamental and
instrumental than Lewin ever intended … a solid foundation … hardened through series of
interpretations… repress[ing] other ways of seeing or organising thinking about change.”46
Lewin’s classic model has continuing relevance to contemporary organizations. Its appli-
cation to an adjudicatory body such as the NGT is useful in understanding this new orga-
nizational reality—the NGT that seeks to promote sustainable development.
2.2 Force-Field Theory
Lewin’s pioneering work on force-ﬁeld theory is often considered as the epitome of a change
model providing the “theoretical underpinning of all his applied work.”47 Field theory,
38. Burnes (2004), p. 985.
39. Schein (2010), pp. 299–313.
40. Ibid., p. 301, emphasis in original.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., pp. 305–7.
44. Ibid., p. 308.
45. Ibid., p. 311.
46. Cummings et al., supra note 24, p. 50.
47. Burnes & Cooke, supra note 24; Cartwright (1952), pp. vii–xv.
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through its scientiﬁc rigour and practical relevance, analyzes the changing behaviour of
individuals through the operation of forces in life. As stated above, the force-ﬁeld theory
integrates with the classic model to bring about planned change at the individual, group,
organization, or societal level.48
According to Lewin, “change and constancy are relative concepts; group life is never
without change, merely differences in the amount and type of change exist.”49 The construct
“force” characterized the direction and strength of tendency to change. He believed that the
driving and “restraining forces” tend to cause the changes. The forces towards a positive side
are the “driving forces,” whereas the “restraining forces” create physical or social obstacles:
“Driving forces”—corresponding, for instance, to ambition, goals, needs, or fears—are “forces
towards” something… tend to bring a change… a “restraining force” is not in itself equivalent
to a tendency to change; it merely opposes “driving forces.”50
Where the forces are equal in magnitude, the status quo will be maintained.51 However,
“quasi-stationary equilibria can be changed by adding forces in the desired direction or
diminishing opposing forces.”52 Lewin recognized that forces shift quickly and radically
under certain circumstances such as organizational or societal crisis, and thus lead to the loss
of the status quo. “New patterns of activity can rapidly emerge, and a new behavioural
equilibrium or ‘quasi-stationary equilibrium’ is formed.”53
To understand the actual changes and its effect, it is important to examine the total
circumstances and not merely one property. According to Lewin:
DRIVING
FORCES
RESTRAINING
FORCES
Figure 2. Kurt Lewin force-ﬁeld analysis.Source: Lewin (1943)
48. Burnes, supra note 38, p. 981.
49. Lewin, supra note 32, p. 307.
50. Ibid., p. 322.
51. Lewin (1943), p. 172.
52. Ibid., p. 320.
53. Lewin (1947), p. 199; Kippenberger (1998), pp. 10–12.
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to change the level of velocity of a river its bed has to be narrowed or widened, rectiﬁed, cleared
from rocks etc.… for changing a social equilibrium, too, one has to consider the total social ﬁeld:
the groups and subgroups involved, their relations, their value system etc.54
To achieve successful change, the “driving forces” must always outweigh “restraining
forces.” This provides support in moving through the unfreezing–learning–refreezing stages of
change. For Lewin, the change was a slow learning process, the success of which depended on
how individuals or groups understood and reﬂected on the forces that impinged on their lives.55
The use of force-ﬁeld theory is helpful to understand the change analysis insights that align
with the current organizational environment of the NGT. The interplay of forces would help
distinguish whether factors within and without the NGT are “driving forces” for change or
“restraining forces” that work against desired change.
3. APPLICATION OF THEORY: THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL
This section deals with the practical application of Kurt Lewin’s theory followed by Schein’s
work that developed the three-step change model. The framework has been applied to var-
ious organizations, including the NHS,56 the poor state of primary education in the state of
Bihar, India,57 gender,58 and IT implementation.59 However, this is the ﬁrst time it has been
applied to an Indian adjudicatory tribunal: the NGT.
In Lewin’s theory, the existence of an “organization” is central to understanding change.
Academics have deﬁned the term “organization” from different perspectives. These include
adopting a professional categorization, as human labour, conscious human activity linking
and co-ordinating all the production agents to achieve the optimum result of the work, or a
scientiﬁc approach.60 A deﬁnition by McGovern suggests that an organization is “an orga-
nised or cohesive group of people working together to achieve commonly agreed goals and
objectives.”61 Adopting McGovern’s deﬁnition, it is advanced here that the courts and tri-
bunals are organizations within the “new public management (NPM)” paradigm.62 The focus
of NPM is on “quality,” namely “achieving the full potential that one is capable of with the
resources one has”63 with a “client-oriented approach.”64 In the context of judicial organi-
zations, “quality” in NPM includes the principles of effectiveness, efﬁciency, and
54. Lewin, supra note 32, p. 327.
55. Burnes & Cooke, supra note 24, p. 413.
56. Baulcomb (2003), pp. 275–80.
57. PLA Notes (1999), pp. 17–23.
58. Lan & Lee (1997), pp. 43–52.
59. Bozak (2003), pp. 80–5.
60. Allen & Sawhney (2018), pp. 4–6; Ivanko (2013), pp. 1–3; Ahmady et al. (2016), pp. 456–7.
61. Allen & Sawhney, supra note 60, p. 4.
62. Ng (2007), p. 11; Van d.Walle &Hammerschmid (2011), p. 191. This article does not address the debate about the
nature of the NPM. The considerable scepticism about the consistency of the NPM has generated a body of lively and
disparate opinion and literature beyond the scope of this article. For details, see Barzelay (2002), p. 15; Lynn Jr (1998);
Pollitt (1995); Christensen et al. (2008); Brunsson (1989).
63. Ng, supra note 62, p. 29.
64. Ibid., pp. 11–12.
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transparency.65 Factors including time, timeliness, competency, consistency, accessibility,
accuracy, and responsiveness provide direction and help in assessing quality service in the
judicial organization.66 The fulﬁlment of quality requirements contributes towards the
legitimization of judicial organizations towards the public and are compatible with values
such as equity and equality.67
The courts and tribunals in India are judicial organizations that guarantee the “quality”
requirements for the effective delivery of justice. Speciﬁcally, the NGT is an “organization”
consisting of legal and scientiﬁc experts who create a symbiotic relationship that operates
collectively as joint decision-makers and adjudicators to dispense environmental justice. The
overarching goal is contained in the Preamble of the NGT Act 2010. It aims for the effective
and expeditious disposal of cases relating to environmental protection, conservation of for-
ests and other natural resources, including enforcement of environmental legal rights, giving
relief and compensation for damages to persons and property, and for matters connected or
incidental. The NPM “quality” principles are reﬂected in the NGT’s measurable character-
istics: participatory parity by giving a liberal and ﬂexible interpretation in terms of
“aggrieved party” (standing) to access environmental justice68; the availability of “resources
to enable participation” through low fees69; the ability both to fast-track and decide cases
within six months of application or appeal70; and application of the sustainable development,
precautionary, and polluter-pays principles when passing any order, decision, or award for
effective implementation of environmental rights and duties in India.71
In this context, I apply Lewin’s model of organizational change to the NGT. Compre-
hending the kinetics of Lewin’s force-ﬁeld theory is vital in learning to apply his “three-step
change” in practical situations.
65. Mak (2008), p. 735. Mak argues that the NPM paradigm inﬂuences the European judicial organization to solve
questions in a liberal democracy. The legitimacy of the judicial organization on the European level is dependent on the
realization of a balance of principles that is supported by the European legal order and society.
66. Petrick & Lindsay (1996), p. 55.
67. Mak, supra note 65, pp. 725–6.
68. Section 18(2) NGT Act 2010 states “an application for grant of relief, or compensation or settlement of a dispute
may be made to the Tribunal by a person who has sustained an injury; is the owner of the property to which damage has
been caused; is the legal representative in the case of death resulting from environmental damage; is a duly authorised
agent; represents a state agency; or is an aggrieved person, including any representative body or organisation.” Parti-
cipatory parity has been addressed in the NGT by providing an expansive interpretation of the term “aggrieved person.”
69. The NGT (Practices and Procedure) Rules 2011, Rule 12(2), provides for an application or appeal where no
compensation has been claimed to be accompanied by a fee of INR 1,000 (GBP 10).
70. Section 18(3) states “the application, or as the case may be, the appeal ﬁled before the Tribunal under this Act shall
be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the application, or, as the
case may be, the appeal, ﬁnally within six months from the date of ﬁling of the application, or as the case may be, the
appeal, after providing the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard.”
71. Section 20 provides “the Tribunal shall, while passing any order or decision or award, apply the principles of
sustainable development, the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle.” See Gram Panchayat Totu
Majthai v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Judgment, 11 October 2011; Durga Dutt v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Judg-
ment, 6 February 2014; Jal Biradari v. MoEF, Judgment, 22 January 2015; Vitthal Gopichand Bhungase v. Gangakhed
Sugar and Energy Ltd, Judgment, 30 July 2014; Forward Foundation v. State of Karnataka, Judgment, 7 May 2015;
Ramdas Janardan Koli v. Secretary, MoEF, Judgment, 27 February 2015; Leo Saldhana v. Union of India, Judgment,
27 August 2014.
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3.1 Unfreeze
Unfreezing the old behaviour to learn something new provides motivation to change. The
focus is to address underlying problems and initiate diagnostic work to accept new learning
and reject old or dysfunctional behaviour.
The unfreezing was triggered by strong “driving forces,” being the Supreme Court of
India and the Indian Law Commission. They identiﬁed problems and challenges relating to
environmental adjudication and dispensation of environmental justice in India. The perceived
accepted need within these institutions to “unlearn and learn something new” was powerful.
The Supreme Court of India was the initial primary external driving force behind the initial
unfreezing or motivation-to-change process. The Supreme Court’s intervention was based on
its twofold concern. First was the complexity and uncertainty underpinning the scientiﬁc
environmental evidence presented in court. The Supreme Court was conscious that complete
scientiﬁc certainty is the exception, not the norm. Uncertainty, resulting from inadequate data,
ignorance, and indeterminacy, is inherent in science.72 The court was aware of the scientiﬁc
limitations of the judiciary in environmental cases where science should undertake a key
function. The involvement of independent qualiﬁed scientists sitting as equals with judicial
members would go some way to ameliorating the above concerns. Second, there is an ossiﬁed
litigious legal system that challenges and possibly surpasses the court delays described in
Jardine v. Jardine in Dickens’s Bleak House. Delay is not a recent phenomenon and can be
traced back to the time of the Raj. It is a result of court clogging, adjournments, missing
papers, absent witnesses, and conscious delaying tactics by both lawyers and the parties.73
In M. C. Mehta v. Union of India,74 the Supreme Court advocated the establishment of
environmental courts, stating:
we would also suggest to the Government of India that since cases involving issues of envir-
onmental pollution, ecological destruction and conﬂicts over national resources are increasingly
coming up for adjudication and these cases involve assessment and evolution of scientiﬁc and
technical data, it might be desirable to set up environment courts on a regional basis with one
professional judge and two experts, keeping in view the expertise required for such adjudication.
There would be a right to appeal to this court from the decision of the environment court.75
The proposal to establish environmental courts was supported by two subsequent cases:
Indian Council for Enviro- Legal Action v. Union of India76 and AP Pollution Control Board
v. M. V. Nayudu.77 The court suggested an environmental court would beneﬁt from the expert
advice of environmental scientists and technically qualiﬁed persons as part of the judicial
process. There was a further recommendation that the Law Commission of India should
examine the matter of establishing an environmental court.
In the Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action case,78 the Supreme Court highlighted the
issue of delay. Cases are lodged within a system already groaning under the weight of its
72. Gill (2016), pp. 178–9.
73. Moog (1992), pp. 19–36.
74. M. C. Mehta v. Union of India (1986) 2 SCC 176.
75. Ibid., p. 202.
76. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (1986) 3 SCC 212.
77. AP Pollution Control Board v. M. V. Nayudu (1999) 2 SCC 718; (2001) 2 SCC 62. The ﬁrst Nayudu case was in
1999 and the second Nayudu case was in 2001.
78. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (1986), supra note 76.
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case-load. The court, aware of the existence of other specialized tribunals, for example in
consumer-protection law, seized the opportunity to highlight the importance of specialized
environmental courts, stating:
The suggestion for the establishment of environment courts is a commendable one. The
experience shows that the prosecutions launched in ordinary criminal courts under the provisions
of Water Act, Air Act and Environment Act never reach their conclusion either because of the
workload in those courts or because there is no proper appreciation of the signiﬁcance of
the environment matters on the part of those in charge of conducting those cases. Moreover, any
orders passed by the authorities under Water, Air or Environment Acts are immediately ques-
tioned by the industries in courts. Those proceedings take years and years to reach conclusion.
Very often, interim orders are granted meanwhile which effectively disable the authorities from
ensuring the implementation of their orders. All these point to the need for creating environment
courts which alone should be empowered to deal with all matters, civil and criminal, relating to
the environment.79
The interventions and dicta by the Supreme Court during this period were also inﬂuenced by
the non-implementation and non-operation of two statutes that supported the creation of a
specialized environmental tribunal. These were the National Environment Tribunal (NET)
Act 1995 and the National Environmental Appellate Authority (NEAA) Act 1997.
The NET Act 1995 provided strict liability for damages arising out of any accident
occurring while handling any hazardous substance and for the establishment of a tribunal for
effective and expeditious disposal of cases arising from such accidents with a view to giving
relief and compensation for damages to person, property, and the environment. The com-
position of the tribunal consisted of a chairperson with membership including vice-chair-
persons, judicial members, and technical members as the central government deemed ﬁt.
Unfortunately, it was not notiﬁed “due to the sheer neglect and/or lack of political will to
take the risk on the part of the executive to pave the way for the establishment of such a
specialized environment Tribunal.”80 The environment tribunal was not constituted.
Subsequently, the NEAA Act 1997 provided for the establishment of the NEAA to hear
appeals with respect to restriction of areas in which any industries, operations, or processes
shall be carried out or not subject to safeguards under the Environmental (Protection) Act
1986. Expertise or experience in administrative, legal, management, or technical aspects of
problems relating to environmental management law, planning, and development were
essential qualiﬁcations for persons to be appointed to the NEAA. The NEAAwas established
on 9 April 1997 to address grievances regarding the process of environmental clearance and
implement the precautionary and polluter-pays principles.81 However, the NEAA did little
work because its role was limited to the examination of complaints regarding environmental
clearances. After the ﬁrst chairperson’s term expired, no replacement appointment was
made.82 In Vimal Bhai v. Union of India High Court of Delhi,83 the court expressed concern
that the government was unable to ﬁnd qualiﬁed members to ﬁll positions in the NEAA. The
posts of chairperson and vice-chairperson remained vacant from July 2000 until the 1997 Act
79. Ibid., p. 252.
80. Desai & Sandhu (2010), p. 103.
81. For a detailed discussion, see AP Pollution Control Board v. M. V. Nayudu, supra note 77.
82. Desai & Sandhu, supra note 80, p. 104.
83. Vimal Bhai v. Union of India High Court of Delhi, CM 15895/2005 in WP(C) 17682/2005.
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was repealed by the National Green Tribunal (NGT) Act 2010.84 Thus, the NEAA was
closed.
Following the powerful observations made by the Supreme Court, the Law Commission,
an active and inﬂuential participant in legal reform in India, became a strong organizational
driving force to motivate change through the establishment of “environment courts.”85 The
Law Commission examined the questions by reviewing the technical and scientiﬁc problems
that arise before courts and observed:
it is clear that the opinions as to science which may be placed before the Court keep the judge
always guessing whether to accept the fears expressed by an affected party or to accept the
assurances given by a polluter.86
The Law Commission was persuaded that, in seeking a balanced, informed decision in such
cases, “environmental courts”with scientiﬁc as well as legal inputs would be better placed to
reach a determination. Such courts could have wide powers to make on-the-spot inspections
and hear oral evidence from resident panels of environmental scientists. In addition, it was
suggested that the establishment of environmental courts would reduce the burden on the
High Courts and Supreme Court, often involving complex and technical environmental
issues, thereby providing accessible and speedy justice.87
At that time, the weaker “restraining force” to the Supreme Court and Law Commission of
India was the Government of India. The government proposed a centralized Appellate
Authority based in Delhi to hear appeals over the statutory authority, namely the Water Act,
1974, the Air Act, 1981, and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.88 The proposal did not
contain provisions for technical or scientiﬁc inputs in the centralized Appellate Authority.
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of ﬁeld-forces regarding the NGT.
DRIVING
FORCES
RESTRAINING
FORCES
Supreme Court of
India
Law Commission
of India
Central
Government of
India
DRIVING FORCE
RESTRAINING FORCE
Figure 3. Initial dominant driving forces. Source: Author
84. NGT Act 2010, s. 38(1) (repealing the NET Act 1995).
85. Law Commission of India (2003), p. 142.
86. Ibid., p. 13.
87. Ibid., p. 21.
88. Ibid., p. 3.
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Initially, the “driving forces” outweighed the “restraining forces,” thereby triggering a change
from the present level to the desired one. Thus, the ﬁrst step of “unfreezing”witnessed the “driving
forces” advocating a change that would shape the future of environmental justice in India.
3.2 New Learning and Change
After an organization is unfrozen, the forces effect a change that reﬂects “new learning” and
moving to a new state. For Lewin, the term learning “refers [ed] in a more or less vague way
to some kind of betterment… and a multitude of different phenomenon.”89 In an organizational
set-up, “new learning” reﬂects “cognitive redeﬁnition” comprising (1) learning new concepts;
(2) learning newmeaning for old concepts; and (3) adopting new standards of evaluation.90 The
two mechanisms that help “new learning” are either through imitation and identiﬁcation with a
role model or scanning the environment.91 Imitation and identiﬁcation work best when there is
clarity about the new concept and way of working. Scanning the environment works through
trial and error and developing own solutions until something works.92
3.2.1 Learning New Concepts
In India, the “new learning” stage witnessed the involvement of both the external and internal
“driving forces” inﬂuenced by the societal needs, values, and hopes, and the long-term
development of Indian environmental justice discourse. The specialized NGT as a learning
new concept following the strong judicial pronouncements and recommendations of the
powerful Law Commission of India was the ﬁrst step towards “new learning.”93
The NGT as a specialized body equipped with necessary expertise to handle environ-
mental disputes involving multidisciplinary issues became a forum offering greater plurality
for environmental justice. As a learning new concept, it was guided by imitation and iden-
tiﬁcation with a role-model mechanism that embraced the need for specialized tribunals with
technical expertise to provide environmental justice.
The external “driving forces” to introduce “change” were ﬁrst triggered by the Ministry of
Environment and Forests (MoEF).94 It is important to note that the MoEF acted as a driving
force between 2009 and 2011. After 2011, it became a strong restraining force. The reason
for this reversal was the replacement of the progressive Minister for MoEF (see Figure 4).
89. Lewin, supra note 32, p. 215.
90. Schein, supra note 39, pp. 308–10.
91. Ibid., p. 310.
92. Ibid.
93. According to the Business dictionary, concept has been deﬁned as “a clear, detailed description of the attributes
and beneﬁts of a new product that addresses the needs of the targeted customers” (http://www.businessdictionary.com/
deﬁnition/concept.html). The concept of tribunals in India has become an essential part and plays an effective role in the
justice-delivery system. A tribunal may be termed as a court if it has all the trappings of a court and satisﬁes the essential
parameters. Every court may be a tribunal but every tribunal necessarily may not be a court. Tribunals are the quasi-
judicial bodies established to adjudicate disputes related to speciﬁed matters that exercise the jurisdiction according to
the statute establishing them. The tribunals emerged not with the sole promise of speedy, effective, decentralized
dispensation of justice, but also with the expertise and knowledge in specialized areas that were felt to be lacking in the
judges of traditional courts. For details, see Law Commission of India (2017), pp. 4, 5, 32. See also Virindar Kumar
Satyawadi v. State of Punjab AIR 1956 SC 153; Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma AIR 1965 SC 1595; Kihoto
Hollohon v. Sri Zachilhu AIR 1993 SC 412; State of Gujarat v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association (2012) 10
SCC 353.
94. In 2014, the MoEF was renamed as the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEFCC). For the
purpose of clarity and consistency, the term MoEF is used throughout this article.
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The Government of India through the MoEF introduced the NGT Bill 2009 in the Lower
House (Lok Sabha) of the Indian Parliament on 31 July 2009.95 According to the then
environment minister, Jairam Ramesh, the tribunal was “one element” of a reformist
approach to environmental governance. To quote the minister from the parliamentary debate:
Environment is becoming increasingly an interdisciplinary scientiﬁc issue … the fact of the
matter is that we need judicial members because there are matters of law involved; and we need
technical members who can provide scientiﬁc and technical inputs .... There are 5,600 cases
before our judiciary today relating to environment. I am sure the number of cases will increase.
We need specialised environmental courts. The Supreme Court has said this. The Law
Commission has said this. India will be one of the few countries which will have such a
specialised environmental court. I believe Australia and New Zealand are the two countries that
have specialised Tribunals.96
Thus, the MoEF acquired illustrative support and direction from Australian and New Zeal-
and specialized environmental tribunals staffed by judges and expert commissioners, gen-
erally, being persons with expert knowledge in environmental matters. The government
proposed the creation of a circuit system for the new tribunal. The government proposed four
regional benches across the country. According to the minister, “a circuit approach would be
followed to enable access for people. The court will go to the people. People would not come
to the court. I assure you this.”97
The Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha on 23April 2010 and Rajya Sabha on 5May 2010. The
NGT Act 2010 received presidential assent on 2 June 2010.98 The NGT Act implements India’s
commitments made at the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and the Rio Conference of 1992, to
take appropriate steps for the protection and improvement of the human environment and pro-
vide effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedies.
The NGT was established on 18 October 2010 and became operational on 5 May 2011
with New Delhi selected as the site for the principal bench.99 The regional benches found
their home in Bhopal for the central zone, Chennai for south India, Pune for the western
territory, and Kolkata is responsible for the eastern region.100 Additionally, to become more
DRIVING
FORCES
MoEF until 2011
DRIVING FORCE
Figure 4. MoEF as a driving force (2009–11). Source: Author
95. Prsindia.org (2009).
96. Statement by Jairam Ramesh, former Minister of Environment and Forests, Indian Parliament, 30 April 2010.
97. Ibid.
98. Gazette of India Extraordinary (No 19 of 2010); National Environment Tribunal Act No 27 of 1995 (http://www.
envfor.nic.in/legis/others/Tribunal.html).
99. Ministry of Environment and Forests Notiﬁcation, May 2011, S.O.1003 E.
100. Ministry of Environment and Forests Notiﬁcation, 17 August 2011, S.O.1908 E.
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accessible, especially in remote areas, the NGT follows the circuit procedure of courts going
to people and not people coming to the courts. Shimla has received circuit benches
from Delhi,101 as has Jodhpur from the central zone,102 Meghalaya from the eastern zone,103
and Kochi from the southern zone.104
Further, as a learning new concept, the NGT was envisioned as a multifaceted and multi-
skilled body in which the joint decision-makers held relevant qualiﬁcations and appropriate
work experience either in law or in technical ﬁelds. Accordingly, the technical experts
became “central,” rather than “marginal,” to the NGT’s normative structure. The combina-
tion of legal, scientiﬁc, and technical expertise had a dynamic impact on the content and
development of environmental policies and law.
From 2011 onwards, both the external and internal “driving forces” displayed
“new learning” in the NGT. The Supreme Court of India in 2012 re-engaged as an
external driving force to institutionalize the NGT. The establishment of the NGT encouraged
the Supreme Court to review its own environmental case-load and consider its
limited environmental expertise. The Supreme Court in Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila
Udyog Sangathan v. Union of India105 transferred all environmental cases, both active
and prospective, to the NGT to render expeditious and specialized judgments and
to avoid the likelihood of conﬂicts of orders between High Courts and the NGT. The court
ordered:
in unambiguous terms, we direct that all the matters instituted after coming into force of the NGT
Act and which are covered under the provisions of the NGT Act shall stand transferred and can
be instituted only before the NGT. This will help in rendering expeditious and specialized justice
in the ﬁeld of environment to all concerned.106
The Supreme Court of India again transferred more than 300 cases to the NGT in
2015. The Green Bench of the Supreme Court, headed by the then Chief Justice
H. L. Dattu, decided to release several cases for swift decisions, thereby also shedding its
pendency.107
3.2.2 Learning New Meaning for Old Concepts
Internally, the NGT demarcated the operational changes by redeﬁning the intellectual
activity that embraced environmental disputes. Learning new meaning for old concepts
was the second step reﬂecting “new learning” in the NGT. These internal forces within the
tribunal corresponded to and helped the NGT to realize the vision of institutionalizing
the larger welfare and interest of the society and environmental protection. They supported
the attainment of the objectives of prevention and protection of environmental pollution,
101. NGT/PB/157/2013/331, 20 December 2013 (ofﬁce order).
102. NGT/PB/266/2013/281, 2 December 2013 (ofﬁce order).
103. NGT/PB/Pr/CB/97/2014/M78.
104. NGT/PB/266/2015/299.
105. Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan v. Union of India (2012) 8 SCC 326.
106. Ibid., p. 347. It is interesting to note that, in Adarsh Cooperative Housing Society Ltd v. Union of India, Order, 10
March 2014, the Supreme Court stayed its own order by which it transferred all environmental cases from High Courts
to the NGT. In Vellore Citizen Welfare Forum v. Union of India 2016 SCC Online Mad 1881, the Madras High Court
stated “however, it appears that the application was withdrawn on 11.8.2014” (para. 78).
107. T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, Order, 5 November 2015.
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provide administration of environmental justice, and made them more accessible within the
framework of the statute. There was a need to enhance the principles of environmental
democracy and rule of law that include fairness, public participation, transparency, and
accountability. In-house expertise with knowledge and skills came via a new visionary CEO
(Chairperson Kumar in the case of the NGT). Change occurred through task and social
leadership and customer-oriented demand (the litigants and lawyers) to access environmental
justice.
In terms of learning new meaning for old concepts, “standing” was reformulated in terms
of “an aggrieved person”108 who has the right to approach the tribunal under its original109 or
appellate jurisdiction110 under the NGT Act. Traditionally in India, the concept of litigant
“standing” in environmental matters has been broad and liberal, facilitated by public interest
litigation (PIL) through two ways, namely representative and citizen standing. The Supreme
Court acting as “amicus environment” locked together the issues of human rights and the
environment to develop sui generis environmental discourse entertaining PIL petitions,
seeking remedies, including guidelines and directions in the absence of legislation.111
The NGT in a similar manner created receptive, accessible opportunities for the
dispossessed and representative non-governmental organizations (NGOs), through the
encompassing term “aggrieved person,” the genesis of which is derived from PIL. It cham-
pioned parity of participation, thereby alleviating inequality and promoting recognition,
capabilities, and functioning of individuals and communities in India’s environmental justice
discourse. The NGT, in Samir Mehta v. Union of India,112 explained the scope and ambit of
the term. The tribunal stated:
108. Aggrieved party, supra note 68.
109. Section 14 NGT Act 2010 states: “the Tribunal shall have the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial
question relating to environment (including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment), is involved and
such question arises out of the implementation of the enactments speciﬁed in Schedule I.” The enactments in Schedule I
include: Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess
Act 1977; the Forests (Conservation) Act 1980; the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1981; the Environ-
ment (Protection) Act 1986; the Public Liability Insurance Act 1981; and the Biological Diversity Act 2002.
110. Section 16 NGT Act 2010 states: “any person aggrieved by an order or decision made, on or after the com-
mencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the (a) Appellate Authority under section 28 of the Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; (b) State Government under section 29 of the Water (Prevention and
Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (c) a Board, under section 33 A of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,
1974 (6 of 1974); (d) Appellate Authority under section 13 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act,
1977; (e) State Government or other authority under section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; (f) Appellate
Authority under section 31 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; (g) any direction issued under
section 5 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; (h) granting environmental clearance in the area in which any
industries, operations or processes or class of industries, operations and processes shall not be carried out or shall be
carried out subject to certain safeguards under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (i) refusing to grant environ-
mental clearance for carrying out any activity or operation or process under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; (j)
any determination of beneﬁt sharing or order made by the National Biodiversity Authority or a State Biodiversity Board
under the provisions of the Biological Diversity Act, 2002, may, within a period of thirty days from the date on which
the order or decision or direction or determination is communicated to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal: Provided
that the Tribunal may, if it is satisﬁed that the appellant was prevented by sufﬁcient cause from ling the appeal within the
said period, allow it to be led under this section within a further period not exceeding sixty days.”
111. State of Uttranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal 2010 3 SCC 402;M. C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath 2006 SCC 213; In re
Noise Pollution v. AIR 2005 SC 3136; Chhetriya Pradushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR
1990 SC 2060; Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 420; Vellore Citizen Welfare Forum v. Union of India
AIR 1996 SC 2715; AP Pollution Control Board v. Prof M.V. Nayudu AIR 1999 SC 812; Narmada Bachao Andolan v.
Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3751. See also Gill (2012), p. 201; Sahu (2008), p. 380; Faure & Raja (2010), p. 225; Gill
(2015) pp. 140–6; Rajamani (2007), pp. 293–4.
112. Samir Mehta v. Union of India, Judgment, 2 August 2016.
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An “aggrieved person” is to be given a liberal interpretation … it is an inclusive but not
exhaustive deﬁnition and includes an individual, even a juridical person in any form. Environ-
ment is not a subject which is person oriented but is society centric. The impact of environment is
normally felt by a larger section of the society. Whenever environment is diluted or eroded the
results are not person speciﬁc. There could be cases where a person had not suffered personal
injury or may not be even aggrieved personally because he may be staying at some distance from
the place of occurrence or where the environmental disaster has occurred and/or the places of
accident. To say that he could not bring an action, in the larger public interest and for the
protection of the environment, ecology and for restitution or for remedial measures that should
be taken, would be an argument without substance. At best, the person has to show that he is
directly or indirectly concerned with adverse environmental impacts. The construction that will
help in achieving the cause of the Act should be accepted and not the one which would result in
deprivation of rights created under the statute.113
The liberal approach of the tribunal based upon the beneﬁts of PIL is evidenced in a series of
cases.114 Two reasons explain this approach. The ﬁrst is the inability of persons due to
poverty, ignorance, or illiteracy, living in the area or vicinity of the proposed project to
understand the intrinsic scientiﬁc details coupled with the effects of the ultimate project and
any disaster it may cause. Thus, it is the right of any citizen or NGO to approach the tribunal
regardless of whether being directly affected by a developmental project or whether a
resident of affected area or not. Second, the subservience of statutory provisions of NGT Act
2010 to the constitutional mandate of Article 51A(g) establishes a fundamental duty of every
citizen to protect and improve the natural environment.
Recent work115 provides evidence that identiﬁes the parties to environmental disputes by
analyzing some 1,130 cases decided by the NGT between July 2011 and September 2015.
The most frequent plaintiffs were NGOs/social activists/public-spirited citizens. They
account for 533 plaintiffs (47.2%) of 1,130 cases. For example, in Vimal Bhai v. Ministry of
Environment and Forests,116 the tribunal allowed an application by three environmentalists
concerning the grant of an environmental clearance for the construction of a dam for
hydroelectric power. The NGT ruled that the environmentalists constituted an aggrieved
party and their claim for a public hearing concerning the granting of an environmental
clearance was sustainable. Overall, the plaintiff group success rate stood at 38.3%. This
signiﬁcant number demonstrates both the opportunity of and the ability of public-spirited
citizens and organizations to use the NGT as a route to seek remedies through collective
proceedings instead of being driven into an expensive plurality of litigation.
Affected individuals/communities/residents brought 17.7% of all cases, with a success rate
of 56%. For example, in R. J. Koli v. State of Maharashtra,117 the tribunal allowed an appli-
cation ﬁled and argued in person by traditional ﬁshermen seeking compensation for loss of
livelihood due to infrastructural project activities. The positive encouragement by the NGT to
litigants in person reﬂects a conscious effort on the part of the tribunal to promote access to
113. Ibid., paras 31, 32.
114. Kishan Lal Gera v. State of Haryana 2015 ALL (I) NGT REPORTER (2) (DELHI) 286; Sri Ranganathan v.
Union of India (2014) ALL (I) NGT REPORTER (2) (SZ) 1; Vithal Gopichand Bhugersay v. Ganga K. Head Sugar and
Energy Ltd (2014) ALL (I) NGT REPORTER (1) (SZ) 49; Jan Chetna v. Ministry of Environment and Forests,
Judgment, 9 February 2012.
115. Gill, supra note 17, pp. 194–6.
116. Vimal Bhai v. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Judgment, 14 December 2011.
117. R. J. Koli v. State of Maharashtra, Judgment, 27 February 2015.
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environmental justice. Indigent and illiterate litigants have been encouraged to speak in their
vernacular language (especially at regional benches) to ventilate their grievances and personal
and community experiences. Conﬁdence-building in the NGT has resulted in motivating
litigation fromwithin groups that traditionally had little or no access to justice. This reﬂects the
NGT’s broad-based, people-oriented approach. The liberal interpretation of “aggrieved
person” opened access to the tribunal to promote diffused and meta-individual rights. The
NGT’s legitimacy is grounded in its inclusive participatory mechanisms.
Additionally, the NGT accepted “eco-centrism”—a nature-centred approach within its
mandate of learning new meaning for old concepts. This is an emerging area wherein the
tribunal recognizes and considers that conservation and protection of nature and inanimate
objects are inextricable parts of life.118 They have an impact on human wellbeing, as they
form the life support system of planet Earth. The NGT, in its judgment in Tribunal on Its
Own Motion v. Secretary of State,119 recognized this approach by following the Supreme
Court judgment in Centre for Environment Law, WWF- I v. Union of India120 and stated
“eco-centrism is, therefore, life-centred, nature-centred where nature includes both humans
and non-humans. Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects not only the human rights
but also casts an obligation on human beings to protect and preserve a species becoming
extinct, conservation and protection of environment is an inseparable part of right to life.”121
The learning new meaning for old concepts was further afﬁrmed by the in-house judicial
and technical experts through “trial and error learning based on scanning the environment”
or, putting it simply, “inventing our own solutions until something works.”122 The traditional
adversarial judicial procedures associated with case management and disposal of the indi-
vidual case have been altered because of the jurisdictional power and promotional activity of
the NGT. Thus, centralizing scientiﬁc experts, as full court members, within the decision-
making process promoted a collective, decision-making, symbiotic, interdisciplinary bench
seeking to harmonize legal norms with scientiﬁc knowledge.
In its commitment to resolve environmental issues, the NGT members expanded and
developed new procedures and powers that provided steadfast foundations to guide decision-
making in environmental matters based upon a rights-based approach. Environmental
dispute litigation in the NGT is not simply adversarial in nature. It is quasi-adversarial, quasi-
investigative, and quasi-inquisitorial in nature to promote effective participatory parity and
involvement of the person aggrieved—for instance, the adoption of an investigative proce-
dure involving the inspection of affected sites by expert members.123 The purpose of site
118. In Intellectual Forum, Tirupathi v. State of AP AIR 2006 SC 1350, the Supreme Court of India recognized “all
human beings have a fundamental right to a healthy environment commensurate with their well-being ... ensuring that
natural resources are conserved and preserved in such a way that present as well as the future generation are aware of
them equally” (para. 84).
119. Tribunal on Its Own Motion v. Secretary of State, Judgment, 4 April 2014.
120. Centre for Environment Law, WWF-I v. Union of India (2013) 8 SCC 234.
121. Ibid., p. 256, emphasis in original. Also see Sudeip Shrivastava v. State of Chattisgarh, Judgment, 24 March
2014; Charudatt P. Koli v. M/s Sea Lord Containers, Judgment, 18 December 2015.
122. Schein, supra note 39, pp. 310–11.
123. Forward Foundation v. State of Karnataka, Judgment, 10 September 2015. InMoEF v. Nirma Ltd, Order of the
Supreme Court, 4 August 2014, the Supreme Court found nothing wrong with the procedure adopted by the NGT
requiring two of its technical members to visit the site and make a report after carrying out a personal inspection.
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inspections is to evaluate contradictory claims, positions, and reports ﬁled by the respective
parties.
The stakeholder consultative adjudicatory process is the most recent of the NGT’s
problem-solving procedures. Major issues having a public impact either on public health,
environment, or ecology can be better handled and resolved when stakeholders are brought
together alongside the tribunal’s scientiﬁc judges to elicit the views of those concerned—
government, scientists, NGOs, the public, and the NGT. Stakeholder process evokes a
greater element of consent rather than subsequent opposition to a judgment. The ongoing
Ganga river,124 Yamuna river,125 and air pollution126 cases are illustrations of the new
stakeholder consultative adjudicatory process involving open dialogue with interested
parties. In K. K. Singh v. National Ganga River Basin,127 the NGT observed:
the Tribunal adopted the mechanism of “Stakeholder Consultative Process in Adjudication”
to achieve a fast and implementable resolution to this serious and challenging environmental
issue facing the country. Secretaries from Government of India, Chief Secretaries of the
respective States, concerned Member Secretaries of Pollution Control Boards, Uttarakhand
Jal Nigam, Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam, Urban Development Secretaries from the States,
representatives from various Associations of Industries (Big or Small) and even the persons
having least stakes were required to participate in the consultative meetings. Various mechanism
and remedial steps for preventing and controlling pollution of river Ganga were discussed
at length. The purpose of these meetings was primarily to know the intent of the executives
and political will of the representative States who were required to take steps in that
direction.128
In this way, efforts are being made to ensure scientiﬁcally driven judgments reﬂect
the interests, expectations, and plans of stakeholders to produce decisions that support
sustainable development and recognize the wider public interest.
The exercise of suo motu power (on its own motion) proceedings in environmental cases is
another situation indicating learning new meaning for old concepts. In suo motu proceed-
ings, a superior court initiates proceedings as PIL in the public interest and acts on its own
volition in the absence of parties.129 The NGT’s jurisdiction is typically triggered by an
aggrieved person ﬁling a motion. Interestingly, the NGT Act 2010 does not expressly pro-
vide the authority to initiate suo motu proceedings. Cases such as increased vehicular trafﬁc
in Himachal Pradesh,130 dolomite mining in the tiger reserve forest in Kanha National
124. K. K. Singh v. National Ganga River Basin Authority, Judgment, 16 October 2014.
125. Manoj Mishra v. Union of India NGT, Judgment, 13 January 2015 (now referred to as the Maily se Nirmal
Yamuna Revitalization Plan 2017).
126. Vardhaman Kaushik v. Union of India and Sanjay Kulshrestha v. Union of India, Order, 7 April 2015.
127. K. K. Singh v. National Ganga River Basin Authority, supra note 124.
128. Ibid., para. 3.
129. Suo-motu power is exercised by the superior constitutional courts. It is a plenary power to meet the demands of
justice. Where there is a ﬂagrant violation of a mandatory provision of either any statute or any constitutional mandate, it
is the duty of the superior court to set aside the illegality in the judgment, as it is well settled that illegality should not be
perpetuated and failure by the court to interfere would amount to allowing illegality to be perpetuated. See Galanter
(2014), p. 74. Galanter argues that the suo-motu judicial “initiatives derive from judicial reaction to a newspaper article
or a letter (the so-called ‘epistolary jurisdiction’), which have become a familiar feature of the Indian judicial scene, rare
but highly visible.” See also In re Amarnath Shrine (2013) 3 SCC 247; Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2003) 11
SCC 241.
130. Court on Its Own Motion v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Judgment, 6 February 2014.
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Park,131 groundwater contamination in the water supply lines and bore wells in Delhi,132 and
the clearing and felling of trees in the Sathyamanglam Tiger Reserve133 are illustrative
of the NGT initiating controversial suo motu proceedings. These cases reﬂect the tribunal’s
self-proclaimed, expansionist power to review environmental issues, ab initio, simply on the
grounds of environmental protection and human welfare. For the tribunal, “suo motu
jurisdiction has to be an integral part of the NGT for better and effective functioning of the
institution. There are some inherent powers which are vital for effective functioning and suo
motu jurisdiction is one such power.”134
The NGT also conferred upon itself the power of judicial review—yet another important and
controversial instance of learning new meaning for old concepts. The Constitution of India vests
the Supreme Court under Article 32 and High Courts under Article 226 with the power of
judicial review to ascertain the legality of legislation or an executive action.135 However, the
power of a tribunal as a “quasi-judicial body” to undertake the judicial review has often been
disputed.136 In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India,137 the Supreme Court observed:
the Tribunals are not substitutes for the High Courts, and they can carry out only a supplemental,
as opposed to substitutional role, since the power of the High Courts and Supreme Court to test
the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. The Tribunals are
therefore not vested with the power of judicial review to the exclusion of the High Courts and the
Supreme Court.138
However, in a series of cases,139 the NGT declared the tribunal is competent and is vestedwith
the jurisdiction and power of judicial review. The tribunal has all the characteristics of a court
and exercises the twin powers of judicial as well as merit review. There is no provision in the
NGT Act 2010 that curtails its jurisdiction to examine the legality, validity, and correctness
of delegated legislation regarding the Acts stated in Schedule I to the NGT Act 2010.140
131. Tribunal on Its Own Motion v. Secretary, MoEF, Judgment, 4 April 2014.
132. Tribunal on Its Own Motion v. Government of NCT, Delhi Order, 19 June 2015.
133. Tribunal on Its Own Motion v. Union of India 2013 SCC Online 1095.
134. Downtoearth.org (2014). Statement made by the then chairperson, Justice Swatanter Kumar. Also see Tribunal
on Its Own Motion v. District Collector, Sivaganga District 2014 SCC On Line 1450 to prevent pollution of the Sambai;
Tribunal on Its Own Motion v. Union of India 2014 SCC OnLine 1433 on a news item published in The Hindu dated 21
November 2013 under the caption “Plan for stadium at Tirupathi raises eyebrows”; Tribunal on Its Own Motion v.
Union of India 2014 SCC On Line 2352 about “Setting up of petrol bunk in Sathyamangalam Reserve forest” published
in The Hindu dated 1 August 2013; Tribunal on Its Own Motion v. The Secretary MoEF 2013 SCC OnLine 1086
regarding unauthorized constructions in Muttukadu coastal zone, report in New Indian Express dated 7 July 2013;
Tribunal on Its OwnMotion v. State of Tamil Nadu, Municipal Administration andWater Supply Department 2013 SCC
Online 1105 regarding quality water to be delivered by public tap, based on letter dated 24 July 2013 from Shri
Ramchandra Srivatsav.
135. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789. It is settled law that judicial review is a part of the basic
structure of the Indian Constitution that “cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution.”
136. Law Commission of India, supra note 93, pp. 54–64.
137. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261.
138. Ibid., p. 302.
139. Wilfred J. v. Union of India NGT, Judgment, 17 July 2014; Kalpvriksh v. Union of India, 17 July 2014; S. P.
Muthuraman v. Union of India, Judgment, 1 September 2015; Himmat Singh Shekhawat v. State of Rajasthan, Judg-
ment, 13 January 2015; Society for Protection of Biodiversity v. Union of India, Judgment, 8 November 2017.
140. In the Union of India v. Major General Shri Kant Sharma (2015) 6 SCC 773 case, though it pertained to the
Armed Forces Tribunal Act 2007, the Supreme Court observed “the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
Constitution of India may not be circumscribed by the provisions of any enactment. However, due regard should be
given to the legislative intent evidenced by provisions of the Acts and courts would exercise their jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of the Acts. When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition
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The exercise of judicial review has evoked mixed responses. Environmentalists felt a strong
message is delivered that the NGT is concerned with not only the merits of the decision, but
also the decision-making process. As an independent body, the NGT aims to protect indivi-
duals against abuse or misuse of power by the authorities.141 However, theMoEF on the other
hand felt that it amounted to usurping its jurisdiction. It claimed that the NGT can only
examine decisions and cannot strike down a statute.142
The NGT’s willingness regarding “inventing our own solutions until something works” to
resolve the environmental issues reﬂects its expansive self-created procedure for learning
new meaning for old concepts. Consequently, it produced changes in both the institutional
and the external landscapes by antagonizing certain state High Courts and furthering the
distance from the MoEF.
3.2.3 Adopting New Standards of Evaluation
Along with the new concepts comes adopting new standards of evaluation for a transfor-
mation change encouraged by drastically increased environmental problems including a rise
in pollution levels and demographic pressures. “Cost and time” help in evaluating the stan-
dards in an organization for customer expectation.143 Contextualizing within the NGT,
adopting new standards of evaluation envisages “aggrieved person” expectation for a faster,
cheaper, and more effective way to access to environmental justice, thereby promoting
participatory parity. The internal driving force of the NGT, through its leadership and reg-
ulatory requirements, helps in evaluating the measurable standards. It allows aggrieved
persons to initiate proceedings before the NGT and “assert diffused and meta-individual
rights.”144 The NGT rules provide for an application or appeal where no compensation has
been claimed to be accompanied by a fee of INR 1,000 (GBP 10).145 Where compensation is
claimed, the fee is equivalent to 1% of that compensation, subject to a minimum of INR
1,000 (GBP 10).146 Thus, the low fees reﬂect the NGT’s open-door commitment to the poor.
Another feature of the NGT is its ability to fast-track and decide cases within six months of
application or appeal.147 To illustrate, Figure 5 demonstrates the status of NGT litigation as
of 31 July 2017.
The ofﬁcial ﬁgures show 23,095 cases were ﬁled, of which 19,740 were decided and
3,355 were pending before the NGT. This demonstrates that 85.4% of the cases were
decided whereas 14.6% of cases remained pending. The NGT’s legitimacy is grounded in its
inclusive participatory mechanisms (standing, time, and costs) that promote dynamism and
(F'note continued)
should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.”However, the value of this judgment has been questioned
in the case of Union of India v. Thomas Vaidyan M., Civil Appeal No. 5327/2015, order dated 16 November 2015. The
Supreme Court has observed that the jurisdictional aspect be considered by a three-judge bench, as the matter involves
some urgency. The issue is pending before the larger bench of the Supreme Court of India.
141. Polanki (2014). Statement by environmental activists (who happen to be lawyers) Ritwick Dutta and Rahul
Choudhary.
142. Ibid.
143. Schein, supra note 39, p. 309.
144. Sahu, supra note 111, p. 379.
145. The NGT (Practices and Procedure) Rules 2011, supra note 69.
146. Ibid., Rule 12(1).
147. NGT Act 2010, supra note 70.
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capability, thereby providing victims of environmental degradation with access to the
tribunal.
Thus, the institutionalization and transformation sought by the NGT are a metamorphosis
of societal environmental interests that encapsulate the wellbeing of not only the individual,
but also the larger public interest. The relative position of the inter-dependent “driving
forces” (MoEF until 2011, Supreme Court of India, and the NGT’s internal forces) came
together and expressed themselves for “new learning” by the establishment of an organized
institution: the NGT through internal procedural expansion and change.
3.2.4 New Learning, Change, and the Restraining Forces in Action
However, this stage of “new learning” has not occurred without struggle. There existed
“restraining forces.” The MoEF after 2011 and the High Courts gained momentum and
strength to restrict the proactive NGT as it sought to take control of the intellectual space for
the right to regulate or respond to environmental issues.
From its inception, and particularly after 2011, the NGT faced institutional challenges due
to limited co-operation and hesitant operational commitment of MoEF and state govern-
ments. Initially, the understaffed bench and inadequate logistic and infrastructure facilities,
coupled with inappropriate housing for bench appointees, led to the resignation of three
judicial members: Justices C. v. Ramulu, Amit Talukdar, and A. S. Naidu.148 The state’s
inaction required intervention by the Supreme Court to remedy the situation.149 Senior
counsel, Gopal Subramaniam, appeared on behalf of the NGT and informed the Supreme
Court about “a very sorry state of affairs” affecting the tribunal. He said:
the members have been put up in the middle of quarters of Class III and IV employees. The initial
budget of INR 32 crores [GBP 3,505,462] was slashed to INR 10 crores [GBP 1,095,513] to be
further reduced to INR 6 crores [GBP 657,308]. Each of the members is paying from his own
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Figure 5. Status of litigation in the ﬁve NGT benches. Source: NGT Annual Report 2017
148. Shrivastava (2012).
149. Union of India v. Vimal Bhai, SLP No 12065 of 2009.
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pocket for travel. They don’t even have a supply of food at work and they are compelled to get
food from the canteen. Is this how the government proposes to treat the sitting and former judges
of the High Courts and Supreme Court of India?150
The Supreme Court described the treatment experienced by the members of the NGT as
“utterly disgusting.”151 Accordingly, the Supreme Court stated that the NGT benches must
become fully functional by 30 April 2013.
The Bhopal bench started functioning in the basement of a building, despite afﬁdavits being led
by the state government claiming suitable accommodation had been provided to the NGT. Justice
Singhvi reacted sharply by observing “we cannot appreciate that a misleading statement was
made before the highest court. A false afﬁdavit was led before the apex court. Accommodation
does not mean basement.”152 The Pune bench was treated in a similar derisory manner. It was
inaugurated on 17 February 2012, but the lack of state support resulted in delays into March 2013.
Kolkata fared even worse. The state ofWest Bengal failed to respond to the orders of the Supreme
Court. The NGT chairperson inspected the Kolkata bench and found the premises, particularly the
accommodation offered to judges, to be “shabby, uninhabitable and without a toilet.”153
There is an explanation for this degrading treatment that affected the establishment and the
early operational effectiveness of the NGT benches. There existed an unresponsive and
dysfunctional state administration that failed to appreciate the importance of green issues.
The then MoEF Minister Jairam Ramesh was known for raising the green proﬁle and hailed
by many as an outstanding environment minister. Nevertheless, he was ﬁghting battles
within his own ministry, the MoEF. Personally, “he remained accessible and responsive but
he could not ensure that his ministry ofﬁcials were also accessible and responsive.”154
Ramesh described the ministry’s environmental working position as:
It’s a huge bureaucracy. There is a structural problem …. It’s easier to reform laws and proce-
dures and hope that would create a new mind-set in these people rather than try for a structural
change …. This is not a ministry where at the end of the day I can say that I put 10,000 mw of
generating capacity, I have started 300 trains, or I opened 60 new mines. It’s basically a
regulatory institution. To that extent unidirectional goals are very difﬁcult to achieve.155
Former minister Ramesh supported and guided the enacting NGT Bill through Parliament
but was unable to establish and promote the benches due to his removal from the MoEF in
2011.156 From 2011 onwards, the “restraining forces” within the MoEF reﬂected structural
inertia, resistance to change, and indifference to an extent that they were reluctant to provide
appropriate ﬁnancial and structural support.
Additionally, the “new learning” stage witnessed the MoEF and High Courts acting as
“restraining forces” questioning the alleged self-validation by the tribunal of further jur-
isdictional powers. The colonization of intellectual space partly by the public promotion of
150. Legal India (2012).
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid.
153. Mahapatra (2013).
154. Rediff (2011).
155. Lenin (2011).
156. Ramesh was moved to the Rural Development ministry in 2011. Reports suggest that he had upset many in
government and the business lobby especially because of the controversial mega-projects such as POSCO, Vedanta,
Lavasa, and Navi Mumbai Airport. See Padma TV (2011).
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its jurisdiction and through its effectiveness in protecting both the environment and the
interests of affected parties was not well received by the MoEF and some High Courts.
The exercise of suo moto powers by the NGTwas raised and challenged by theMoEF. The
ministry had refused to confer this power on the tribunal despite repeated requests to do so. In
an afﬁdavit before the Supreme Court of India in 2013, the MoEF stated:
the government of India has not agreed to confer suo motu powers on the Tribunal. It is for the
NGT, an adjudicatory body, to follow the provisions of the NGT Act 2010 … resulting in
embarrassment to the government before Parliament.157
The claim of alleged judicial overreach was bolstered when the High Court of
Madras restrained the NGT Chennai bench from initiating suo motu proceedings. The High
Court stated:
NGT is not a substitute for the High Courts. The Tribunal has to function within the parameters
laid down by the NGT Act 2010. It should act within four corners of the statute. There is no
indication in the NGT Act or the rules made thereunder with regard to the power of the NGT
to initiate suo motu proceedings against anyone, including statutory authorities.158
Further, an order passed by Madras High Court dated 7 July 2015 stated that the NGT should
not initiate more suo motu proceedings.159 Jurisdictional expansion in this regard remains
unsettled, although its procedural value is signiﬁcant. It allows the NGT to initiate pro-
ceedings and permits the tribunal to roam far and wide, searching for pressing environmental
issues that it considers to be in the public interest.
The NGT’s self-deﬁned expansion of powers to include judicial review reﬂects further
territorial extension at the potential cost of alienation and challenge by the High Courts
that previously and exclusively enjoyed the exercise of these powers. For example, the
Bombay High Court in Central Indian Ayush Drugs Manufacturers Association v. State of
Maharashtra160 decided that the NGT does not possess power to adjudicate upon the vires or
validity of any enactment in Schedule I or of subordinate legislation framed under such
enactment. Increasing tribunalization is viewed by some High Courts as serious jurisdic-
tional encroachment, thereby causing institutional confusion, collusion, and complexity.161
Figure 6 reﬂects the interplay of the principal “driving forces” and “restraining forces.”
The “driving forces” aimed to bring a change whereas the “restraining forces” represent
resistance to the change.
However, as the NGT overcame suspicion bordering on hostility with the support of the
Supreme Court and its own results-based commitment, it ensured that the terms of the NGT
Act 2010 were given practical effect throughout India. Despite initial setbacks and
157. Anand, supra note 21. An afﬁdavit was ﬁled by the MoEF Deputy Secretary R. K. Agrawal. However, the
afﬁdavit invited the annoyance of the Supreme Court, as it described it as “breach of all norms of decency.”
158. Subramani (2014).
159. P. Sundarajan v. Deputy Registrar NGT (2015) 4 Law Weekly 23, at 27.
160. Judgment in W. P. No. 6360 of 2015 decided on 28 September 2016.
161. For example, constitutional law expert Rajeev Dhawan states “the NGT cannot strike down a statute. It can only
examine the decisions that are taken and consider if they are in compliance with the three principles laid down in Section
20 of the Act.”Also see Rediff (2013). Justice Ruma Pal, former judge of the Supreme Court of India, questioned: “Who
do we include within the term ‘judiciary’? Is it limited to constitutional courts or does it also include those Tribunals
which decide rights and merely have the trappings of a court?”
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continuing concerns from powerful agencies, the “driving forces” outweighed the
“restraining forces,” allowing the move to the next stage: refreeze.
3.3 Refreeze
Lewin and Schein’s framework recognizes that refreezing is the ﬁnal step in any change
wherein “the new learning will not stabilize until it is reinforced by actual results.”162
Refreezing represents institutionalization of change wherein the “new learning” and beha-
viour become habitual, as it will “produce better results and be conﬁrmed.”163 However, the
refreeze stagemay not be permanent and could lead to the restart of the “three-stepmodel”; if it
does not produce better results, this information will be perceived as a disconﬁrming information
… systems are, therefore, in perpetual ﬂux, and the more dynamic the environment becomes, the
more that may require an almost perpetual change and learning process.164
The refreeze stage for the NGT is both complex and contentious.
The institutionalization of the NGT and its reinforcement by actual results indicate that it
had moved into the refreeze status. The manifestation of the actual results or outcome is
witnessed at both the international and the national levels. Internationally, the NGT is con-
sidered as a framework for “the world’s largest network of local environmental Tribunals,
expected to increase citizen access to environmental justice.”165 Recently, the World Com-
mission on Environmental Law and the Global Judicial Institute on the Environment
expressed their great appreciation for the NGT, for its precedent-setting jurisprudence, as
well as its international conferences over the several years that successfully brought together
parliamentarians, judges, lawyers, scientists, academics, students, and other international and
national delegates.166
At the national level, the practical testimony to “producing better results” is evidenced by
the signiﬁcant case growth in the NGT. Figure 7 illustrates this growth.
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Figure 6. Interplay between driving and restraining forces. Source: Author
162. Schein, supra note 39, p. 311.
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid.
165. United Nations Development Programme (2014), p. 13; See also the commendations, pp. 1–2 of this article.
166. iucn.org (2018).
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The NGT has found favour with the common man: “aggrieved person” seeking to access
environmental justice. Figure 7 represents the status of NGT litigation from July 2011 to
January 2018. The growing public awareness and the conﬁdence in the NGT symbolize
widespread credibility that promotes and supports environmental justice.
The performance indicator for actual and better results is further substantiated by the NGT
producing judicially binding decisions that offer ecological, technological, and scientiﬁc
resource knowledge. By reconﬁguring its jurisdictional boundaries, its decisions through
expansive rationale and innovative judgments go beyond the “courtroom door” with
far-reaching social and economic impact. The legal lens has been expanded by the NGT
decisions through either formulating policies or assisting state governments with the
implementation of these policies, thereby adopting both a problem-solving and a policy-
creation approach.
A major innovation is the NGT’s willingness to offer scientiﬁcally based structural
planning and policies that respond creatively to weak, ineffective regulation or even the
absence of regulation. The scientiﬁc experts apply constructive interpretation to expand the
scope of rules and regulations if the activity is injurious to public health and environment.
Such an interpretation serves the public interest in contrast to the private or individual
interest. For example, in Asim Sarode v. Maharashtra Pollution Control Board,167 the NGT
identiﬁed the absence of notiﬁed standards for used-tyre disposal. Open tyre burning is toxic
and mutagenic. Stock-piled used tyres can also be a health hazard, as they become breeding
grounds for diseases and can catch ﬁre. Accordingly, the NGT directed the regulatory
agencies to urgently develop regulations dealing systematically with the issue based on
the “life-cycle approach,” considering the pollution potential, data on tyre generation,
technology options, techno-economic viability, and the social implications based on the
principles of sustainable development and the precautionary principle. Again, in Haat
Supreme Wastech Limited v. State of Haryana,168 the NGT expanded the scope of
rules relating to bio-medical waste-treatment plants. The Bio-Medical Waste (Management
and Handling) Rules 1998 are silent about whether the establishment and operation of a
treatment plant require environmental clearance. Bio-medical waste, by its very nature, is
hazardous. The tribunal directed that it is mandatory to obtain environmental clearance for
the treatment plants. This requirement, when properly carried out, would help to ensure an
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Figure 7. Status of litigation in ﬁve NGT benches. Source: NGT website (http://www.greenTribunal.
gov.in/)
167. Judgment, 6 September 2014.
168. Judgment, 28 November 2013.
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appropriate analysis of the suitability of the location and its surroundings, the impact on
public health, and a more stringent observation of parameters and standards by the project
proponent.169
In addition, the NGT adopted an accountability-focused approach whereby a
diverse set of actors including governmental and local authorities, companies, and multi-
national corporations were restrained in compromising human welfare and the
ecology. Importantly, in its decisions, the NGT identiﬁed the MoEF and related regulatory
agencies as demonstrating indifference, ultra vires, or negligence in the exercise of
their responsibilities.170 In Jai Singh v. Union of India,171 the NGT identiﬁed failure of
government and regulatory authorities in preventing and controlling pollution arising from
illegal and unauthorized mining, transportation, and running of screening plants and stone
crushers. The tribunal stated:
the activity must be brought within the control of legal and regulatory regime. The concerned
authorities of the Government and Boards should not only realise their responsibility and
statutory obligation but should ensure that there is no unregulated exploitation of the natural
resources and degradation to the environment. Respondents, including the State Government,
the Boards, MoEF and other concerned authorities have permitted such activity despite orders of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the High Courts and the Tribunal. There is deﬁnite evidence
on record to show that illegal mining has continued .... Merely denying the authenticity of the
photos, videos and other documentary evidences on the pretext that they were doctored would
not amount to discharge of the onus placed upon the respondents.172
Frequently, the MoEF has been subjected to severe criticism by the NGT for failing to
observe its own procedural rules, such as the improper granting of licences without prior
environment impact assessments (EIAs) being completed or appropriately conducted.173 In
India, there have been serious failures regarding cumulative environment impact assessment
studies, rendering this crucial process meaningless. For example, in Krishi Vigyan Arogya
Sanstha v. MoEF,174 the tribunal cancelled the grant of environmental clearance for a coal-
based thermal-power project in the absence of a proper cumulative environmental impact
assessment (CEIA). No scientiﬁc assessments were done in relation to expected excess
cardiovascular and respiratory mortality, children’s asthma, and respiratory dysfunction
attributable to the exposure to the air pollutants from the plant, the impact on the water bodies
and its impact on aquatic life, and the effect of nuclear radiation in and around the plant. In
Prafulla Samantray v. Union of India175 (the POSCO case), the issue before the NGT was
169. See also T. Muruganandam v. MoEF, Judgment, 11 November 2014; Samata v. Union of India, Judgment, 13
December 2013; M/S Ardent Steel Ltd v. Union of India, Judgment, 27 May 2014; Pathankot Welfare Association v.
State of Punjab, Judgment, 25 November 2014.
170. Sarpanch, Grampanchayat Tiroda v. State of Maharashtra, Judgment, 12 September 2011; Jan Chetna v. MoEF,
Judgment, 9 February 2012; Prafulla Samantray v. Union of India, Judgment, 30 March 2012; Adivasi Mazdoor Kisan
Ekta Sangathan v. MoEF, Judgment, 20 April 2012; Osie Fernandes v. MoEF, Judgment, 30 May 2012; Rohit
Choudhary v. Union of India, Judgment, 7 September 2012.
171. Judgment, 18 February 2016.
172. Ibid., para. 93.
173. Sreeranganathan K. P., Aranmula v. Union of India, Judgment, 28 May 2014; Prafulla Samantray v. Union of
India, supra note 170; Rohit Choudhary v. Union of India, supra note 170; Samata v. Union of India NGT, supra note
169; Kalpavriksh v. Union of India, Judgment, 17 July 2014.
174. Judgment, 20 September 2011.
175. Prafulla Samantray v. Union of India, supra note 170.
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opposition to the proposed POSCO project, involving the construction of an integrated steel
plant with a service seaport at Paradip in the state of Orissa. The construction of the proposed
plant and port threatened the area’s unique biodiversity and anticipated the dislocation and
displacement of the long-standing forest-dwelling communities. The NGT held no meticu-
lous scientiﬁc study was undertaken, leaving lingering and threatening environmental and
ecological doubts unanswered. Factors such as the siting of the project, present pollution
levels, the impact on surrounding wetlands and mangroves and their biodiversity, risk
assessment with respect to the proposed port project, the impact of source-of-water
requirements under competing scenarios, and the evaluation of the zero-discharge proposal
were not studied. The tribunal required a comprehensive and integrated EIA based on at least
one full year of baseline data, especially considering the magnitude of the project and its
likely impact on various environmental attributes in the ecologically sensitive area. The
initial clearance was set aside as arbitrary and illegal and vitiated in the eyes of law.
The tribunal has been prepared to call senior civil servants to the court having heard often
inappropriate or implausible explanations from the MoEF and related regulatory authorities’
decisions including union and state governments. For example, the NGT stated:
Directions issued by us have not been complied. Though the counsel for MoEF submits that
report has been ﬁled which we notice, least we could say about that it is misleading and is not in
terms of our direction. The afﬁdavit as directed has not been ﬁled. We direct presence of
deponent in the afﬁdavit, namely, Dr Sunamani Kereketta, Director, MoEF before the Tribunal
on the next date of hearing.176
On occasions, senior civil servants have been told that they face a term of “state hospitality”
(jail) for statements bordering on contempt.177 Indeed, in Sudeip Shrivastava v. State of
Chhattisgarh,178 the tribunal took the bold, provocative step of criticizing theMinister of State
for Environment and Forest and theMoEF for acting arbitrarily and ignoring relevant material
issues that would have contributed to a holistic appraisal of the environmental problem.
The tribunal has on occasions reprimanded the regulatory authorities in the strongest
language in open court. Such public criticism has done nothing to endear the tribunal to key
agencies and ministerial ofﬁcials unused to such embarrassing rebuke that exposes their
inefﬁciency or indifference. For instance, in the Ganga pollution case,179 the NGT stated “it
is really unfortunate that the Ganges continues to be polluted. Why don’t you [the state and
federal governments] do something? You raise slogans [about cleaning the river] but do
exactly opposite of that.”180
In the Delhi air-pollution case,181 the NGT commented:
176. Economictimes.indiatimes (2017b).
177. Ibid.
178. Judgment, 24 March 2014.
179. K. K. Singh v. National Ganga River Basin Authority, supra note 124.
180. BBC (2016); also see Economictimes.indiatimes (2017a). The NGT chastised the MoEF for not abiding by its
directions on implementation of a notiﬁcation on air-pollution emission standards and water consumption for coal-based
thermal-power plants.
181. In 2014, a young lawyer and environmentalist, Vardhman Kaushik, led a petition (Vardhman Kaushik v. Union of
India, Application 21 of 2014) before the Principal Bench of the NGT with a limited pleading to identify and curb the
sources of rising air pollution in the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi. The petition has escalated into one of the
most important NGT cases. See Hindustan Times (2017); Swachhindia (2017).
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every newspaper has been carrying headline that the air pollution [in Delhi] was going to be
higher this week. Still you took no action .... Are people of Delhi supposed to bear this? In this
country, it is a dream to have prescribed norms of air quality.
In the Goa Foundation v. Union of India case,182 the NGT critically observed:
The MoEF is the “most messy” Ministry, for its changing stance regarding protection of the
Western Ghats…. Why can’t it (MoEF) take a clear stand on whether it wants to keep the Gadgil
report or not? If it can’t then we will have to call the MoEF secretary in person to clear the matter
…. Despite our speciﬁc directions, MoEF has failed to ﬁle an appropriate afﬁdavit. A vague
afﬁdavit has been presented before the Tribunal today.183
Gill’s study documents that regulatory agencies (comprising the MoEF, state government,
local authorities, and pollution-control boards) constituted 942 defendants (83.4%) of 1,130
reported judgments between 2011 and 2015.184 The MoEF was the defendant in 284 cases
(25.1%); state government appeared as the defendant in 341 cases (30.2%); a local authority
was listed in 78 cases (6.9%); and pollution-control boards in 239 cases (21.2%). The data
suggest a repeated failure on the part of regulatory authorities to undertake their statutory
environmental protection duties and social responsibilities regarding environmental matters.
The regulatory agencies dealing with environmental matters have been unable to deliver,
according to an ofﬁcial enquiry, due to:
a knee-jerk attitude in governance, ﬂabby decision-making processes, ad hoc and piecemeal
environmental governance practices …. The institutional failures include lack of enforcement,
ﬂawed regulatory regime, poor management of resources, inadequate use of technology; absence
of a credible, effective enforcement machinery; governance constraints in management; policy
gaps; disincentives to environmental conservation, and so on.185
The failure of central and state agencies to follow due process has been a regular andmajor cause
of complaint from aggrieved persons who seek redress from the NGT. The tribunal has proved
stubbornly determined and successful in enforcing the environmental regulations. Its case-law
demonstrated its ability and willingness to require transparency and accountability that ulti-
mately constitute the building blocks of good governance and environmental democracy.
3.3.1 Thawing and Restart Process
However, the institutionalization of the NGT in the refreeze stage has importantly triggered a
subsequent thawing or renewal process. The external “restraining forces” slowly and steadily
have become sufﬁciently powerful to destabilize the NGT and set in motion a fresh change.
These volatile forces are gaining momentum by creating situations whereby ﬁeld-level
changes become inevitable, and hence the restart of the process. Again, the “restraining
forces” include political and economic interests, policy and legislative interventions, and
regulatory agencies, particularly the MoEF.
182. Judgment, 18 July 2013. A case was led by two NGOs: Goa Foundation and the Peaceful Society, Goa. They
sought directions requiring the state government to take steps for the conservation and protection of another World
Heritage Site, the Western Ghats, as requested by the high-powered panel, the Western Ghats Ecology Expert Panel
(WGEEP). The Western Ghats are a treasure trove of biological diversity and are recognized as a global “hotspot of
biodiversity.”
183. Ghosal (2014); Aggarwal (2014).
184. Gill, supra note 17, pp. 196–7.
185. High-Level Committee on Forest and Environment Related Laws (2014), pp. 8, 22.
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Economic interests and the national growth agenda are powerful “restraining forces”
impacting upon the NGT. The current national economic strategy has assumed heightened
signiﬁcance under the leadership of India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi. He is known for
his ability to drive change and his commitment to accelerate sustainable growth in India.
Prime Minister Modi, at the February 2018 World Sustainable Development Summit,
emphasized the current environmental problems being faced by the developing nations and
the need for a development process that is inclusive and sustainable, resulting in beneﬁt to all
stakeholders:186
This summit is a reinforcement of India’s commitment to a sustainable planet, for ourselves and for
future generations. As a nation, we are proud of our long history and tradition of harmonious co-
existence between man and nature. Respect for nature is an integral part of our value system. Our
traditional practices contribute to a sustainable lifestyle. Our goal is to be able to live up to our
ancient texts which say, “Keep pure For the Earth is our Mother and we are her children.” India has
always believed in making the beneﬁts of good governance reach everyone. Our mission of “Sabka
Saath Sabka Vikas” is an extension of this philosophy. Through this philosophy, we are ensuring
that some of our most deprived areas experience social and economic progress on par with others.187
Nevertheless, Modi is also known as a pro-business, market-oriented reformer who aims to
double the Indian economy in the next seven years. Modi claims “India would have a $5
trillion economy by 2025.”188 Modi’s efforts in building India’s global appeal for investors
by introducing an “ease of doing business” strategy has yielded returns. India rose 30 places
to 100 in theWorld Bank’s Ease of Doing Business global rankings and was named as one of
the top ten countries in reforming its business environment.189
Notwithstanding these ambitious commitments, the reality within India remains disturbing.
There continues to exist a failure gap between the public statements of PrimeMinister Modi and
their application in practice by his “agents,” being the relevant ministries, regulatory agencies,
and civil servants. An illustration of unfettered economic promotion occurred in May 2016,
when the then Minister of Environment and Forests, Prakash Javadekar, stated his ministry
granted environmental clearance (EC) to 2,000 projects in 190 days for ease of doing business.
The minister stated environment clearances are given without compromising stringent pollution
norms.190 However, evidence suggests that regulatory environmental laws and procedures were
ignored or short-circuited in the race for economic returns. Errors include failure to provide
mandatory documentation, inadequate stakeholder participation, and deliberate concealment or
submission of false or misleading information for the EC process. A study by the Centre for
186. Narendra Modi (2018); also see Indian Express (2015). At the 2015 UN General Assembly Sustainable Devel-
opment Summit, Prime Minister Modi stated “addressing the needs of 1.3 billion poor people in the world is not merely
a question of their survival and dignity or our moral responsibility. It is a vital necessity for ensuring a peaceful,
sustainable, and just world. Our attack on poverty today includes expanded conventional schemes of development, but
we have also launched a new era of inclusion and empowerment, turning distant dreams into immediate possibilities ....
We are focusing on the basics: housing, power, water and sanitation for all—important not just for welfare, but also
human dignity .... We are making our farms more productive and better connected to markets; and, farmers less
vulnerable to the whims of nature . . . Nations have a national responsibility for sustainable development.”
187. Ibid.; also see Modi (2015), wherein he argues for a low-carbon economy to achieve a clean and green India,
thereby mitigating the menace of climate change and improving the environment. It should be based on a collective
partnership between people, businesses, the scientiﬁc community, the government, and NGOs.
188. Financial Times (2018).
189. World Bank Report (2017), pp. 4, 7.
190. More (2016).
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Science and Environment, a Delhi-based research and advocacy organization, stated that,
between June 2014 and April 2015, 103 mining projects and 54 infrastructure projects were
granted ECs. The coal-mining sector was a special beneﬁciary, as projects were allowed in
critically polluted areas via a diluted public-hearing requirement.191 The data showed that pro-
jects were being cleared and processes were made so convoluted that they stopped working to
protect the environment. The report stated:
overall trend suggests that green clearances have been made faster through incremental changes
“easing” the clearance process. However, there is no evidence that the quality of EIA reports has
improved or enforcement on the ground have become more effective.192
In 2016, the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India published a Performance Audit on
Environmental Clearance and Post Clearance Monitoring Report (CAG Report).193 Out of
216 projects that had been granted ECs between 2011 and July 2015, the report stated:
In 25% cases, the Environment Impact Assessment reports did not comply with Terms of
Reference and in 23% cases they did not comply with the generic structure of the report.
Cumulative impact studies before preparing the Environment Impact Assessment reports were
not made a mandatory requirement, thus the impact of a number of projects in a region on the
ecosystem was not known. Ministry had not followed due process in issue of Ofﬁce Memoranda
and the Ofﬁce Memoranda so issued had the effect of diluting the provisions of original
notiﬁcation.194
Environment regulations are being diluted to promote the ease of doing business and pursue
an economic development model. The present government drafted controversial legislative
proposals and took decisions that accommodate corporate interest and manipulate and sub-
vert laws and safeguards that protect the rights of the tribal poor and the marginalized. These
include the new National Forest Policy that allows the corporate sector to grow, harvest, and
sell trees on government-owned forest lands, explicitly banned under the existing National
Forest Policy 1988195; reducing tribal rights over forest land in favour of industries without
securing the prior consent of Gram Sabha or village council196; allowing 16 new thermal-
power plants in 2017 to come up in violation of the air-pollution norms. More than 300 old
fossil-fuel-based power plants will also continue to violate pollution norms until at least 2020
with the government’s approval.197
The NGT has consistently maintained its base position that it is not opposed to economic
development. Nevertheless, it has been equally consistent that economic development is
subject to the statutory rules and regulations passed to accommodate growth within the legal
framework of sustainable development. The tribunal has been steadfast in its restraining
decisions that identify processes that seek to fast-track development programmes by ignoring
environmental protection rules. For example, in the Society for Protection of Environment
and Biodiversity v. Union of India,198 the NGT quashed the December 2016 notiﬁcation
191. Cseindia (2016).
192. Sinha & Mehta (2017), p. 2, emphasis added.
193. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (2016).
194. Ibid., paras 2(5), 2(6), 2(7).
195. Shrivastava (2018a).
196. Shrivastava (2018b).
197. Shrivastava, supra note 195.
198. Judgment, 8 November 2017.
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issued by the MoEF whereby substantive provisions of EIA Notiﬁcation 2006 that require
prior EC for building and construction activities were diluted. According to the NGT, the
2016 notiﬁcation was ultra vires, as it permitted construction of buildings and apartments
without complying with the environmental norms. The tribunal held that the magnitude of
the environmental footprint would be immense and unregulated building and construction
activity would cause considerable environmental damage. In a strongly worded judgment,
the NGT observed:
The MoEF&CC has failed to produce any study, literature, evaluation of the reason for taking
such a retrograde decision…. The said amendment notiﬁcation is only a ploy to circumvent the
provisions of environmental assessment under the EIA Notiﬁcation, 2006 in the name of “ease of
doing responsible business” and there is no mechanism laid down under the amendment noti-
ﬁcation for evaluation, assessment or monitoring of the environment impact of the building and
construction activity. The construction industry consumes enormous resources and has a sig-
niﬁcant energy footprint; the sector emits 22% of India’s total annual carbon-dioxide
emission …. The MoEF&CC has failed to fulﬁl its statutory responsibilities.199
Similarly, in Paryawaran Sanrakshan Sangarsh Samiti Lippa v. Union of India,200 the NGT
was left with a “deep sense of foreboding and serious anxiety on the future of the State and its
progeny”201 in the context of the proposed number of hydropower projects in the
state of Himachal Pradesh and their subsequent ecological impacts. The NGT recognized the
rights of villagers to be consulted concerning the construction of the Kashang Integrated
Hydroelectric Project.202 The tribunal directed the MoEF and state government to ensure
that, prior to the forest clearance for the project, the proposal is placed before a Gram Sabha
of villages in the Kinnaur district of the state of Himachal Pradesh.203 The decision of the
regulatory authorities failed to meet the statutory requirement to seek consent from forest-
dwelling tribals and other communities under the Forest Rights Act 2006.
These cases demonstrate that the Indian government and associated authorities failed to
enforce the environment norms for the “ease of doing business.” Further, India opposed the
international guidelines that require free or uninﬂuenced consent of tribal communities for
commercially using their traditional knowledge at the global biodiversity negotiations in
Cancun, Mexico.204
The vulnerability felt by the MoEF as the result of the activity and willingness of the NGT
to publicly criticize the ministry resulted in a practical response with the establishment by the
MoEF of the High-Level Committee (HLC) in 2014 to review forest- and environment-
related laws. T. S. R. Subramanium was appointed as the chairperson.205 Its terms of
199. Ibid., paras 17, 18, 23.
200. Judgment, 4 May 2016.
201. Ibid., para. 16.
202. The construction of the 130-megawatt Kashang Integrated Hydro Electric Project involved the acquisition of
forest land, thereby affecting the forest cover, valuable pine trees, and jeopardizing the livelihood of the community. See
generally the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006 and
condition 16 of the “In Principle” forest clearance.
203. See alsoOrissa Mining Corporation v. MoEF, 18 April 2013. The Supreme Court directed that the smallest units
of local governance use their powers and take a decision on whether the Vedanta Group’s USD 1.7 billion bauxite-
mining project in Odisha’s Niyamgiri Hills should go forward. The decision validated the Gram Sabha’s power under
the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006.
204. Shrivastava (2016).
205. High-Level Committee on Forest and Environment Related Laws, supra note 185.
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reference were to assess the status and implementation of each of the key six Acts206 vis-à-vis
the objectives, examining related various court orders and judicial pronouncements, and
recommending and drafting proposed amendments to these Acts. Importantly, what was
absent from the HLC’s terms of reference was the authority to review the NGT Act.
Nevertheless, the HLC exceeded its mandate and made recommendations that, if imple-
mented, would have severely restricted the operational effectiveness of the NGT by the
creation of extra decision-making institutional institutions: district environmental courts and
an Appellate Board.
The HLC recommended the establishment of special environmental courts in every district
and a new “umbrella” law—the Environmental Laws (Management) Act (ELMA). The
ELMA provided for the creation of two institutions—the National Environmental Manage-
ment Authority (NEMA) at central level and the State Environment Management Authority
(SEMA) at state level—as full-time processing and EC and monitoring agencies.207 ELMA
was also to be provided with an Appellate Board against the decisions of NEMA or SEMA or
the MoEF in respect of project clearance, prescribing a three-month time limit for disposal of
appeals. The decisions of the government, NEMA, or SEMA under this proposed law would
not be questionable before nor enquired into by any court or tribunal either via suo moto or at
anyone’s behest on any ground.208 The jurisdiction of the NGT was to be limited to enter-
taining applications by parties aggrieved by the decisions in appeals under NEMA or SEMA
for review on grounds permissible and subject to limitations applicable to judicial review of
administrative actions by the High Courts and the Supreme Court of India.209
The HLC report was completed within three months and submitted to the government on
18 November 2014. It was subsequently considered by the Parliamentary Standing Com-
mittee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests. The committee submitted its
ﬁndings on 3 July 2015. The committee did not accept the HLC report because the period of
three months allotted to the HLC for reviewing the six environmental Acts was considered
too short and there was no cogent reason for rushing the report without comprehensive,
meaningful, and wider consultations with all stakeholders.210 A careful reading of the text
further suggests that the committee was supportive of the existing environmental judicial
framework, particularly the NGT, and that it should not be disturbed. The Parliamentary
Committee stated:
Some of the essential recommendations of the HLC have been doubted and would result in an
unacceptable dilution of the existing legal and policy architecture established to protect our
environment. Further, an impression should not be created that a Committee whose constitution
and jurisdiction are itself in doubt, has been used to tinker with the established law and policy.
Should the government wish to consider speciﬁc areas of environmental policy afresh, it may
consider appointing another Committee by following established procedures and comprising of
acclaimed experts.211
206. Environment (Protection) Act 1986, supra note 109; Forest (Conservation) Act 1980; Wildlife (Protection) Act
1972; Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974; Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1981; and
Indian Forest Act 1927.
207. High-Level Committee on Forest and Environment Related Laws, supra note 185, pp. 62, 63, 68–71.
208. Ibid., p. 75.
209. Ibid.
210. Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests (2015), p. 9.
211. Ibid.
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The amendment to the Finance Act 2017 is another recent effort to curb and dilute the powers
of the NGT through legislative intervention. The Department of Revenue, Ministry of
Finance vide notiﬁcation dated 1 June 2017, in exercise of its powers under section 184 of the
Finance Act 2017, notiﬁed the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualiﬁ-
cations, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 (new rules).
The new rules give unbridled power to the central government to provide for the appoint-
ment, term of ofﬁce, salaries and allowances, registration, removal, and other terms and
conditions of service of the chairpersons and members of the tribunal including the NGT. For
instance, the new rules have altered the terms of the NGT Act 2010 by allowing a non-
judicial member to be the chairperson of the tribunal. Section 5 of the NGT Act 2010 states
that the chairperson of the NGT must have been a judge of the Supreme Court or a Chief
Justice of a High Court. As per the new rules, a person can be appointed as a chairperson of
the NGT if he is, or has been, or is qualiﬁed to be a judge of Supreme Court; or is, or has been,
Chief Justice of a High Court; or has, for a period of not less than three years, held ofﬁce as a
judicial or expert member or is a person of ability, integrity, and standing, and having special
knowledge of, and professional experience of, not less than 25 years in law, including ﬁve
years of practical experience in the ﬁeld of environment and forests. The qualiﬁcations to
become an expert or judicial member at the NGT are also diluted, while giving greater
bureaucratic control over the selection procedure.212
These new rules are designed to create systemic changes that undermine the system of
institutional checks and balances and potentially create a conﬂict of interests. In Union of
India v. R. Gandhi,213 the Supreme Court held:
Impartiality, independence, fairness and reasonableness in decision making are the hallmarks of
Judiciary. If “Impartiality” is the soul of Judiciary, “Independence” is the life blood of Judiciary.
Without independence, impartiality cannot thrive. Independence is not the freedom for Judges to
do what they like. It is the independence of judicial thought. It is the freedom from interference
and pressures which provides the judicial atmosphere where he can work with absolute com-
mitment to the cause of justice and constitutional values …. If Tribunals are to be vested with
judicial power hitherto vested in or exercised by courts, such Tribunals should possess the
independence, security and capacity associated with courts.214
The new rules invited criticism from green activists, who called the provisions
“draconian” and “the death knell for NGT and all other Tribunals in the country” and stated:
The new qualiﬁcations have serious consequences and huge implications for the quality of
leadership as well as independence of the NGT ... the NGT will not have the administrative as
well as functional autonomy and will be “under” the control of the very Ministry [MoEF] whose
decisions they are required to adjudicate upon.215
The changes threaten to cripple the independence of the NGT. The new rules were chal-
lenged in the Supreme Court by former environment minister Jairam Ramesh because they
violate the doctrine of separation of powers and suffer from issues of excessive delegation to
212. Dutta (2017).
213. (2010) 6 S.C.R 857.
214. Ibid., pp. 907–8.
215. Aggarwal (2017); Dutta, supra note 212; Venkatasubramanian (2017).
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the central government.216 Consequently, the Supreme Court in February 2018 stayed the
provisions of the Finance Act 2017 that amended the rules of appointment to the tribunals,
including the NGT. The court directed that the “terms and conditions of service of members
of the National Green Tribunal shall be governed by the provisions of the National Green
Tribunal Act, 2010.”217 The interim stay order by the Supreme Court protected the NGT, as it
ensures that the appointment and selection process to the NGT remains free from executive
inﬂuence and ensures parliamentary scrutiny.
In addition, the recent development of non-ﬁlling bench membership, reluctance to
authorize appropriate staff, infrastructure, and resource support by the MoEF bears testimony
to the fact that the government wants to restrict the activities of the NGT. Seventy percent of
the bench positions are currently vacant.218 This is a systematic way of dismantling the
institution. The NGT Act 2010 states that the minimum number of full-time judicial and
expert members will not be less than ten, with a maximum of 20. At present, the NGT has
ﬁve bench members (three judicial and two technical experts) for the principal bench in
Delhi. On 28 March 2018, the Supreme Court appointed Justice Jawad Rahim as the Acting
Chairperson of the NGT because of the petition ﬁled by the NGT Bar Association.219 The
regional benches (Bhopal, Chennai, Pune and Kolkata) have no bench members and thus are
dormant. The Supreme Court sought an explanation from the central government about the
non-ﬁlling of vacancies in the NGT. Shocked by the crisis, the Delhi High Court recently
asked the centre whether it “planned to wind up the NGT?”220 Instead of ﬁlling the vacant
positions, the MoEF on 1 December 2017 issued a notiﬁcation empowering the NGT
chairperson to constitute single-member benches.221 The Supreme Court, as a driving force,
on 31 January 2018, held the ministry’s notiﬁcation approving the constitution of NGT
single-judge benches to be ultra vires the NGT Act 2010.222
Nevertheless, there is evidence of strong “restraining forces” seeking to destabilize the
NGT, as illustrated in Figure 8.
Currently, there exists a turf war between various interests and institutions (NGT, MoEF,
associated regulatory authorities) involved in environmental regulation and environmental
jurisprudence. The refreezing stage is witnessing the “restraining forces” outweighing the
“driving forces.” As presented by Lewin and Schein, the equilibrium is lost and the NGT’s
power and effectiveness are being challenged by the oppositional, negative force ﬁeld.
Consequently, unfreezing of the NGT has commenced.
216. Livemint (2017).
217. Basu (2018).
218. Sahu (2018). Justice Swatanter Kumar, the dynamic Chairperson NGT, retired on 19 December 2017; he was
succeeded by acting Chairperson Justice U. D. Salvi, who retired on 13 February 2018. The Chennai bench became
inoperative from 3 January 2018. No judgment has been passed by the Kolkata bench since 16 November 2016. The
Pune bench has not had an expert member since the retirement of Dr Ajay Deshpande in May 2017.
219. Indian Express (2018a).
220. Nair (2017).
221. Amendment to the National Green Tribunal (Practices and Procedure) Rules, 2011, which states that, in
exceptional circumstances, the chairperson may constitute a single-member bench. See Ashok (2017).
222. Indian Express (2018b).
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4. CONCLUSION
Lewin believed that there is nothing so practical as a good theory.223 This article has laid out
Lewin’s organizational change theory as supported and enhanced by Schein. Thereafter, it is
applied chronologically to the establishment and growth of the NGT. By identifying the
reasons and actions of the principal actors and interests involved in the dynamic rise and
decline of the tribunal, there emerges a holistic explanation that provides a further example of
the insightfulness of Lewin’s work. Simply offering a record of events without investigating
and analyzing the story behind the happening is misleading and would reﬂect a doctrinal
approach unsuitable for the pages of this Journal.
Speaking truth to power can be perilous, as the NGT judges, chairman, lawyers, and
litigants have discovered. The creation of a tribunal that seeks to change the face of envir-
onmental jurisprudence by providing access to justice for all has created a powerful group of
“restraining forces.” The MoEF, state governments, and various environmental statutory
bodies and their ofﬁcers are unaccustomed to being questioned in a probing, informed, and
systematic manner or have their decisions scathingly challenged or overturned in a public
forum. Previously, these authorities enjoyed both an ofﬁcial and an unofﬁcial decision-
making licence power directly associated with various expert committees, boards, and ofﬁ-
cials, as well as the minister. The result was often arbitrary approval of projects without
undertaking the proper environmental and social-impact assessments and disturbingly often
in violation of pertinent laws and rules. Additionally, some High Courts along with the
MoEF went so far as to challenge the authority of the tribunal to exercise suo moto and
judicial review powers. The tribunal’s constant position of decisions based on the principle
of sustainable development and the enforcement of the rules upholding the protection of the
environment has proven to be embarrassing to those committed to a fast-track economic
development strategy.
History can be repetitious. The demise of the NEAA offers a salutary case lesson.224
Constituted by statute in 1997, albeit with limited powers, the government failed to ﬁll the
vacancies of chair and deputy chairpersons between 2000 and 2010, stating an inability to
DRIVING
FORCES
RESTRAINING
FORCES
Supreme Court of
India
MoEF
DRIVING FORCE
RESTRAINING FORCE
Economic and
Development
Interests;
Legislation
Regulatory
Agencies
Figure 8. Current dominant restraining forces. Source: Author
223. Lewin, supra note 32, p. 421.
224. Vimal Bhai v. Union of India High Court of Delhi, supra note 83; NGT Act 2010, supra note 84.
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identify suitably qualiﬁed people. The Act was repealed by the NGT Act 2010. Given the
current and alarming number of vacancies on the NGT benches resulting in the de facto
operational closure of the regional benches, could there be a similar fate planned for the
NGT: death by 1000 cuts?
Today, the NGT stands at a crossroads. Without the replacement of qualiﬁed bench
members and the formal renewal of support from key actors who constitute the “restraining
forces,” the tribunal may fall into the Thucydides trap: a victim of its own success.
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